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EVERYTHING WILL FINISH WITH KOSOVO:

A BACKGROUND PAPER ON SEEKING PEACE IN THE BALKANS

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Conflict in the Balkans is an arcane topic and since the Dayton Peace Accords went into effect there is a temptation to believe that all the problems are solved. That is far from true. Ethnic cleansing has begun in Kosovo. This paper will explain that situation and illustrate the choice between possible solutions or having war spread in the Balkans, and possibly beyond.

The ethnic Albanians in Kosovo have been resisting human rights abuse since 1989. That resistance has been mostly nonviolent until recently. The strategy used had inadequacies but, contrary to the opinion of many, it was not a failure. Besides getting the ethnic Albanians' view across to the rest of the world, it averted war for many years and prevented what could have been a much worse tragedy. It is important that this be understood. The challenge now is to rekindle that spirit of nonviolence so the Albanians can achieve their desired goals in a less traumatic and more fulfilling manner.

ETHNIC TUG-O-WARS IN THE BALKANS

Albanians are direct descendants of the Illyrians who first inhabited the Balkan Peninsula around 1000 BC. The Slavic people moved into the area during the 6th century CE and by the end of the 7th century had transformed all the Illyrian-speaking people except the Albanians. The Slavs in the Balkans were called southern Slavs, or yugo Slavs. "Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia and parts of Macedonia lost their Illyrian language and were thoroughly slavicized, so that only the Albanians remain as direct descendants of the ancient Illyrians."¹

¹*Encyclopedia, Britannica*, Volume 11, p. 1097.



MAP OF THE BALKANS

Source: GAO/NSIAD-93-174, p. 2. (modified)

During the 11th century CE, the schism in Christianity split the yugo Slavs. The westernmost part of the southern Balkans (now Slovenia and Croatia but then part of the Austria-Hungarian Empire where the Roman Catholic Church flourished) remained loyal to the Pope. The eastern areas (presently Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia) became part of the Eastern Orthodox Faith.

What is now Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia,

Albania, and Bosnia was overrun by the Turks during the 14th and 15th century CE, and became part of the Ottoman Empire. The pre-existing Eastern Orthodox Faith survived except for in Bosnia and in Albanian lands.

1. *The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, and After.*

In the first Balkan War Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria fought Turkey in Macedonia and Thrace (an ethnic region at the southern tip of the Balkan Peninsula) and ended the Ottoman Empire's hold on Europe. Afterwards the Albanian state was established with less than half its ethnic territory. Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria absorbed the remaining Albanian lands. It has ever since been the ambition of Albanians to again unite. Ancient Macedonia was also divided among Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria after this war, while Greece captured Thrace from Turkey..

In the second Balkan war, the victors fought over the division of captured land. Greece and Serbia, aided by Romania, sided against Bulgaria. Bulgaria lost and had to pull back from territory it had occupied. Macedonia was then divided between Greece and Serbia, Thrace went to Greece, and the rich lands of the southern Dobruja went to Romania.

In October 1915, Bulgaria entered World War I and re-occupied all of Serbian Macedonia. At wars end in 1918, the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" was formed and Serbian Macedonia became one of its provinces. Again Bulgaria had to grudgingly pull out.



Kosovo

45 years. He suppressed ethnic hatreds and eventually the people intermixed and marriages began to cross religious lines.

Italy occupied Kosovo and Albania in 1940 and invaded Greece from there. This backfired and Greece occupied part of Albania. Finally the Germans came down from Yugoslavia to rescue the Italians. Underground resistance by Albanians hindered the Italian war effort.

Meanwhile, Bulgaria once again occupied most of Macedonia. After the war, communist leaders in Greece and Bulgaria pressed for the whole of Macedonia to become an independent republic in the communist bloc. But Tito's influence was stronger and Serbian Macedonia remained part of a reunited Yugoslavia. For the third time Bulgaria had to pull out.

Tito still eyed Greek Macedonia, however -- particularly the Aegean Sea port of Salonika (also spelled Solonica; or, in Greek, Thessaloniki) which is in Greek Macedonia (also called Aegean Macedonia). In 1945 Tito said, "We shall never renounce the right of the Macedonian people to unite. There are brothers in Aegean Macedonia to whose destiny we are not indifferent." In 1947 Tito agreed with Bulgarian Premier Georgi Dimitrov that, when the communist uprising in Greece was successful, Greek Macedonia should become part of Yugoslavia and Greek Thrace should be annexed to Bulgaria. Soviet objection to this plan resulted in Tito's split with Moscow the following year.

Relations between Yugoslavia and Greece gradually improved until 1961. In December of that year, under pressure from Macedonian leaders, Tito publicly urged Greece to recognize the Macedonian minority in Greece and consider its status and interests. A miffed Greek government rebutted that no such minority exists and, in March 1962, canceled an agreement that allowed easy access across the border for residents in that vicinity.

After Tito's death in 1980, hatreds were again fanned to life by nationalist movements. Conditions worsened throughout the 1980s and triggered separatist movements in Croatia and

The "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" was disjointed and weak. Serbia was the only province sufficiently organized to maintain order, and thus became dominant. King Alexander (reigning 1929-1934) changed the country's name to Yugoslavia. Although he had high aims, his rigid rule perpetuated Serbian hegemony and worsened political unrest.

2. World War 2 and After.

Germany occupied Yugoslavia during World War 2. Puppet governments sparked more hatred. Communist opposition led by Marshal Josip Broz Tito, a Croat, grew in strength and secured most of the mountainous areas, in which Tito set up a provisional government. His forces later helped the communists occupy Yugoslavia.

Tito then formed a communist government which held Yugoslavia together for

Slovenia. After the fall of communism in 1991 and the end of the Cold War, four Yugoslav provinces declared themselves to be sovereign nations. Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia were the first to be recognized by the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU). Recognition of Macedonia was blocked because Greece objected to the name of Macedonia as a nation -- fearing a movement to reunite Greek Macedonia.

In a compromise move, the UN Security Council on 7 April 1993 approved Macedonia for membership under the provisional name of "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," (FYROM). Germany, Britain, France, Denmark and the Netherlands established diplomatic ties with FYROM on 16 December 1993. Macedonia was recognized under the name of "Macedonia" by the US and Australia in February 1994, without deference to Greek objections.

CAST OF CHARACTERS IN THE CURRENT CRISIS

The countries in the southern Balkans presently involved are Yugoslavia, Albania, and Macedonia. Waiting in the wings are Bulgaria and Romania. Ethnic Albanians make up a strong bloc in the southern Balkans. Besides the population of Albania itself, there are another 2.5 million in contiguous parts of Serbia (Kosovo) and Macedonia.

1. Yugoslavia.

Since 1992 the Yugoslav federation consists of two entities -- Serbia and Montenegro. Kosovo is the southern tip of Serbia -- it is not a country, it is not even one of the equal entities which make up Yugoslavia, it is merely part of one entity. But until 1989 it was an autonomous part of Yugoslavia.

Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic is generally considered the reason behind the war in Bosnia and now in Kosovo. The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) said that the "international community should begin to view Milosevic as part of the problem, rather than the solution..."² Even when he was only president of Serbia he called the shots for all of Yugoslavia. When he couldn't run for a third term in Serbia, he became president of Yugoslavia. Milosevic wants to keep Kosovo as part of Serbia and is against international mediation for what he considers an internal issue. The prime minister of Yugoslavia is Momir Bulatovic.

The Yugoslav National Army is under the control of Milosevic and is comprised of soldiers from both Serbia and Montenegro.

a. Serbia has been the dominant partner in the Yugoslav federation. Slobodan Milosevic, of the Serbian Socialist Party (formerly known as the Communist League of Serbia) was elected president in 1987. In his April 1987 speech at the Kosovo Polje monument, he told the Kosovo Serbs: "You shouldn't abandon your land just because it's difficult to live, because you are pressured by injustice and degradation... No one should dare to beat you..." This "catapulted" him to the Serb presidency and head of Serbia's nationalist movement.³ His two terms in office saw the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. But it was the Kosovo Polje speech

²*Kosovo Dialogue: Too Little, Too Late.*

³*Cited in Kosovo Spring.*

which prompted the popular saying: “Everything started with Kosovo and everything will finish with Kosovo.”⁴

In December 1997, because Milosevic could not run again, his protégé Milan Milutinovic was elected president. But Milutinovic is still overshadowed by Milosevic, now president of the Yugoslav Federation. Mirko Marjanovic is prime minister of Serbia.

Serbia has special paramilitary police which are used within the Serbian borders, ostensibly under the command of President Milutinovic. However, it appears they are under the ultimate control of Yugoslav President Milosevic. These special police are currently being used decimate Kosovo. (See below)

b. Montenegro is a partner with Serbia in the Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, but is now showing discontent with Serb domination. That started when Milo Djukanovic unseated Momir Bulatovic as president of Montenegro in October 1997. Bulatovic was Milosevic’s puppet whereas Djukanovic is his critic. Filip Vujanovic is Montenegro’s prime minister.

In early April 1998, a statement from Djukanovic’s party accused Milosevic of leading a “policy of war against the whole world,” which is “the policy of staying in power at any price.”⁵ Later that month Djukanovic threatened to break with Milosevic’s policies, and in early May insisted that any action in Kosovo by the Yugoslav National Army not include Montenegrin troops.

In a move to minimize the rising assertiveness of Montenegro, Milosevic on 18 May 1998 orchestrated a parliamentary vote of “no confidence” in the federal government headed by then Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, a supporter of Montenegrin President Djukanovic. Two days later Milosevic appointed his old buddy, Momir Bulatovic, former president of Montenegro, as prime minister of Yugoslavia. Bulatovic immediately fired five ministers who were Djukanovic sympathizers.

On 11 June 1998, after destruction of the Drenica and Decani areas (discussed below), Montenegrin President Djukanovic called for an “urgent end to the violence” in Kosovo and urged a return to negotiations.⁶ He also urged Milosevic to accept outside mediation. Djukanovic says the only alternative to dialogue is war. He favors autonomy for Kosovo, but within the Serbian republic. Montenegro had by this time absorbed over 8,000 refugees from Kosovo.

c. Kosovo. Kosovo is the least developed part of Yugoslavia. Its main resource is minerals and its main industry is mining. Ninety percent of the 2 million people are ethnic Albanians (known as Kosovars). Kosovo was given autonomy under Yugoslavia’s 1974 constitution because it had a larger population than Montenegro and the Albanians in Kosovo were about to become the third largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia. Autonomous was the minimum Tito could allow and still maintain harmony.

That autonomy was eliminated in 1989 by then Serbian President Milosevic. This brought an immediate response. 1,300 miners went on strike in Trepka. Hundreds of thousands of people marched and demonstrated. The Serbian government reacted to this nonviolent resistance with more

⁴Cited in L’Abate-2.

⁵Agence France-Presse dispatch, 4 April 1998.

⁶Agence France-Presse dispatch, 11 June 1998.

arrests and violent repression.

A state of emergency and martial law was declared in Kosovo in March 1990. The curfew was set at 9:00 PM. Autonomy was further reduced by eliminating Kosovo's right to veto legislation pertaining to that province. In July, Albanians in the Kosovo Parliament proclaimed the Republic of Kosovo as a member of the Yugoslav Federation. Three days later Serbia dismissed the Kosovo Parliament and Government.

In September 1990 the Albanian members of the dismissed Parliament secretly proclaimed the constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. Later that month the Serbian government approved its new constitution which did not recognize Kosovo's autonomy.

During 1991 and 1992 the military occupation of Kosovo was extended to factories, newspapers, the University, all public places and all political/judicial/administrative offices. Some 150,000 Albanians were dismissed, or resigned in protest, when they refused to sign a loyalty oath to the Serbian government. Kosovars are now denied political, economic, medical, and educational rights. Serbian special police enforced this policy.

The Kosovars then set up parallel schools, medical care, and social help which they operate clandestinely from private homes. Their parallel government has suggested a voluntary 3% tax which most Albanians pay.

On 24 May 1992 the Kosovars held an independence vote which Serbian police and Yugoslav federal troops tried to prevent by arresting activists and seizing ballot boxes. Despite intimidation, Kosovars flocked to secret polling places to vote for a president and parliament committed to independence. Kosovar community leader and writer, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, was the only candidate for president. He is a moderate who advocates passive nonviolent techniques and non-cooperation to resist the Serb oppression. Rugova is head of the Kosovo Democratic League and favors complete independence for Kosovo.

Adem Demaci is another ethnic Albanian who advocates a more active resistance. He is known as the Nelson Mandela of Kosovo because he spent 28 years in a Yugoslav jail for "nationalist agitation," "hostile propaganda," and related offenses.⁷ He was a political prisoner under Tito, was released in 1990, and was awarded the Andrei Sakharov Award by the European Parliament in December 1991. Demaci has become increasingly critical of Rugova since 1994 and now leads the Kosovo Parliamentary Party. His present stand is for Kosovo to either be a third republic on a par with Montenegro and Serbia (called Balkania), or be independent. His earlier stand, however, was to unite Kosovo with Albania.

Kosovar non-cooperation has led to a crackdown from Belgrade. Serbs consider Kosovo the birthplace of their nation and are not amenable to relinquishing control over their historic sites. Kosovo was once the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church and it was in the battle of Kosovo Polje that the medieval Serbian empire was defeated by the Turks in 1389. The Serbs then struggled under Turkish rule, and preserved their Christian religion and culture, until the Ottoman empire was defeated almost 500 years later. Serbia looks upon this defeat and oppression as the growing pains of their nation.

⁷See Doder.

2. Macedonia.

Another half-million ethnic Albanians make up 22% of landlocked Macedonia's population. (That is the official figure, the Albanians claim they are many more.) They live in the westernmost part where they form a majority. They have openly demonstrated in support of their counterparts in Kosovo, and have also started an underground university because the constitution prohibits higher education in anything but the Macedonian language.

Although Macedonia has now been recognized as an independent state, division exists within the country itself -- between Albanians and Macedonian Slavs. In May 1993 Nevzat Halili, the radical Albanian leader in western Macedonia, initiated what is viewed as the first step of succession. In an open letter to Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov he demanded that western Macedonia be granted the status of a "constituent nation" so the ethnic Albanian population, although a minority in the country as a whole, could veto any proposed future changes to the Macedonian constitution. This status was granted, thanks to Albania's help.

To complicate this scenario, Serbia until recently considered Macedonia to be southern Serbia and tried to minimize Bulgarian influence. Bulgaria, on the other hand, remembers how many times it has controlled Macedonia and been evicted. The situation was so threatening when Macedonia became independent that on 11 December 1992 the UN Security Council unanimously approved the deployment of peacekeepers to the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." This was the first time the UN has sent peacekeepers to an unscathed area for the purpose of preventing war. Currently there are about 750 peacekeepers -- some 350 from the US and the remainder from Scandinavian countries -- participating in this "preventive deployment" operation along Macedonia's 260-mile border with Serbia. Their United Nations mandate expires on 31 August 1998 but will likely be renewed and the number of peacekeepers may be boosted to 1,000. Macedonia President Kiro Gligorov has requested that the multilateral force remain in Macedonia.

3. Albania.

Prior to the Cold War's end, Albania was ruled by a Stalinist government so strict that it broke with the USSR because Moscow was too soft. Many thousands of Albanian people fled the carnage following the fall of communism in Europe. After much bloodshed the icons of Stalin were removed and a free-market economy was pursued. In March 1991, after 52 years of estrangement, the US restored diplomatic ties with Albania. Later that month a national election ended 46 years of one-party dictatorship. By March 1992 the Democratic Party gained a majority in the coalition government and the last trace of communism was eradicated.

Albania is the poorest country in Europe. Discontent again surfaced in 1997 when a risky investment scheme wiped out many people's savings. Riots swept the country. The army abandoned some positions while mobs acquired heavy weapons and millions of small arms. A nationwide state of emergency was declared with stringent martial law. Still the army could not contain the riots. Evacuations and looting continued as the criminal element surfaced to exploit conditions. Eventually 5,000 UN peacekeepers were called in under Italian command. Order was restored by July under a new president, Rexhep Meidani, and the state of emergency was lifted. The last UN contingent departed in August 1997. Roughly 2,000 people lost their lives. The country suffers extreme poverty and its infrastructure is being repaired slowly.

Albania sides with the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. Albania also has overtly supported the Albanian population in Macedonia. When radical leader Nevzat Halili demanded that western Macedonia be a "constituent nation," Albania blocked Macedonia's entry into the OSCE until such status was granted.

4. Bulgaria.

Although Macedonia was divided among Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia after the first Balkan war, the choice part of Macedonia accorded Bulgaria was seized by Serbia and Greece during the second Balkan war. Bulgaria had to withdraw from land previously assigned to it and was left with only mountainous areas. Bulgaria still claims that the Slavs in Macedonia are really Bulgarians.

Bulgaria's United Democratic Forces party came to power in April 1997 as a pro-reform government with Petar Stoyanov as president. Ivan Kostov became premier. Shortly after his inauguration Stoyanov stated: "For Bulgarians, borders represent yet another category to which we are particularly sensitive. The borders drawn at Yalta [after World War 2] severed us and some other nations of Central and Eastern Europe from where we naturally belong."⁸

5. Romania.

Romania also made a violent transition at the end of the Cold War. It held its first free election in 50 years during February 1992 and the anti-communist coalition made a strong showing. Then in November 1996 Romania threw off the last shackles of its communist past and elected geology professor and reformer Emil Constantinescu as its president.

Romania signed a friendship treaty with Serbia in April 1994, but how that will hold up under the Constantinescu administration is unknown. Nevertheless, informal alliances are emerging based on expediency. They could become polarized along ethnic and historical lines. Greece, Serbia and Romania could conceivably form an alliance to oppose what they perceive as an arc of countries led by Turkey.

CRACKDOWN ON KOSOVO

Ever since Kosovo was stripped of its autonomy in 1989, the ethnic Albanians (Kosovars) have carried out a largely peaceful campaign of civil disobedience and non-cooperation. But as frequently happens, some became impatient and formed militant groups which have now consolidated as the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK in Kosovo but referred to as KLA in the west). Its stronghold started in the hilly Drenica region of central Kosovo, but its headquarters shifts. At first the KLA was only armed with light weapons such as AK-47 automatic rifles. Now, according to the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), through the clandestine help of well-organized and wealthy ethnic Albanians (living in Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, and the west), the KLA is becoming better equipped.⁹ Weapons such as the Russian Kalashnikov assault rifles (millions of which were stolen from the Albanian army during the 1997 riots), rocket-propelled grenades, and the precise German anti-tank weapon called Armbrust have been noticed. Some observers believe the KLA leadership is outside Kosovo -- that KLA external representatives and prime sources of funds are Swiss based.

⁸Stoyanov

⁹See *Kosovo Dialogue: Too Little, Too Late*.

KLA operations are controversial. The Yugoslav and Serbian governments call them terrorists. Ibrahim Rugova's shadow government want them to disband. Foreign nations don't like the splintered Kosovo leadership. People who desire a nonviolent solution want the KLA to accept a cease fire. But as conditions worsen the KLA becomes more popular. They control some 40% of Kosovo. In early July the KLA claimed 30,000 troops but western sources estimate the number closer to 15,000. At least three of Kosovo's major parties have offered to become the political voice of the KLA.

1. **Drenica Area.**

The Serb government used what it calls terrorist tactics to justify a bloody crackdown on the Drenica region. Special Serb police shelled villages and civilian centers. They used tanks, armored vehicles, heavy machine guns, artillery, helicopters, and mortars. Street protests were banned and any violation brought a brutal response. Homes were burned and there were reports that refugees seeking safety were strafed from helicopters. Kosovar President Rugova accused the Serbs of ethnic cleansing. Rugova was reelected as president of the Kosova shadow government during the forbidden election on March 23rd. A new parliament was also elected.



Kosova

Showing Drenica Area

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The Yugoslav army, though ostensibly reluctant to intervene in what Serbia calls an internal dispute, did nevertheless station troops along the Albanian border to staunch any flow of arms and prevent Albanian militants from joining the KLA. On March 25th Albania signed a five-year military cooperation agreement with Macedonia. The next day Albanian troops prepared to defend against the Yugoslav army along their border.

On March 31st the UN slammed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. Any further UN sanctions are unlikely because of Russia's opposition and veto power in the Security Council. The arms embargo will have no immediate effect, but it will have a long-term effect which won't hurt the general public, and provides a political setback for Milosevic.

By mid March there were daily demonstrations in Kosovo by tens of thousands -- sometimes hundreds of thousands -- of Kosovars. These daily demonstrations continued for 60 days.

2. **Decani Area.**

The Decani area, 62 miles (100 kilometers) west of Pristina, borders Albania and is almost exclusively ethnic Albanian population. On 22 April 1998 a Yugoslav National Army convoy entered that region. Two days later the army attacked eight villages along the border and claimed to have killed at least 26 Albanians who were trying to enter Kosovo. Citing this threat of infiltration the army sent more troops to strengthen its border patrol. To investigate such claims as killing Albanian infiltrators, the OSCE sent a mission to Albania to monitor the 45 miles (75 kilometers) of border between that country and Kosovo.

Fierce fighting broke out in the Decani area in late May. The entire region was blocked while Serbs attacked many villages with planes, cannons and rocket launchers. Electricity and water supplies were cut off. Entire villages were leveled. Meanwhile, nearly 500 Serbian special police resigned or were fired because they refused to fight in Kosovo.

The UNHCR estimated on August 4th that 200,000 people (10% of the Kosovar population) have been displaced since February -- an estimated 70,000 during the last week alone. 27,000 have fled to Montenegro, 13,000 to Albania, and 130,000 are still on the road or hiding in the hills in Kosovo. The remaining have apparently found refuge with family or friends. UNHCR spokesperson Kris Janowski said the Serb actions are "very much reminiscent of what we saw in Bosnia.... Many areas are being de facto depopulated with some burning and destruction of property which has no military justification."¹⁰ Janowski said it would be a nightmare trying to reach the refugees still in Kosovo through military checkpoints and battle lines: "If the situation -- no electricity, no regular food supplies -- continues, we will probably be caught in a situation which we know extremely well from Bosnia, where we will have tens of thousands of people squeezed into pockets."¹¹

In addition, between 1990 and 1995 (after autonomy was revoked and before the present violence started), some 350,000 Kosovars fled to western Europe. This diaspora is believed to be financing the KLA. But about 144,000 of these refugees have not been granted asylum and are to be repatriated. Amnesty International said: "In addition to those who are currently in flight, there are an estimated 150,000 asylum seekers from [Yugoslavia], most of them Kosovo Albanians, in western Europe," and warned of their personal danger if returned at this time.¹² The Council of Europe has also asked member states "to renounce their intention to forcibly return rejected Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo, and to grant them temporary protection until such time as the human rights situation in Kosovo allows them to return in safety and dignity."¹³

As violence continues the death toll now approaches or has passed 600. But if allegations of mass graves near Orohovac prove to be true, the known deaths since February will top 2,000.

3. *Attempts to Promote Dialogue.*

The Balkan Contact Group (consisting of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the US) called on Yugoslav President Milosevic to negotiate. He then agreed to dialogue with the Kosovar leaders but ruled out foreign mediation. Kosovars and all other countries want third-party mediation. Russia thinks an OSCE mission could help start talks between the disputing parties. The OSCE is the only regional organization to which Russia belongs.

The US sent Richard Holbrooke, who negotiated the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia, to join Robert Gelbard as special envoys in Balkans. They shuttled back and forth between Milosevic and Rugova, but couldn't bring the two together. Finally on May 13th Rugova agreed to meet with Milosevic in Belgrade without outside observers. This created a deep split in the Kosovars and contributed to Rugova's loss of influence. Two of his 15 advisers resigned and the remainder agreed that the international mediator condition be reinstated. But some did praise Rugova's decision.

¹⁰Cited in Agence France-Presse dispatch, 4 August 1998.

¹¹Cited in Agence France-Presse dispatch, 24 July 1998.

¹²*Kosova: Amnesty International Public Statement.*

¹³Cited in *Kosovo Spring*.

On May 15th the two Balkan leaders met and agreed to further talks between six-person delegations. The two delegations met in Pristina the following week. They agreed on the need for confidence building measures and the first most obvious one was to reduce the level of violence. They scheduled weekly meetings -- the next one to take up the security issues allowing more freedom of movement and reducing life-threatening situations. Meanwhile, the KLA maintained that any agreement of which they were not a part was invalid. No further meetings took place. As fighting escalated in Decani, the Kosovars refused to talk with the Serbs.

4. *International Responses.*

The UN, usually reluctant to criticize sovereign nations on how affairs are handled within their own border, was prompted to accuse the Serbs of "atrocities." The UN report warned: "They must not be allowed to repeat the campaign of ethnic cleansing and indiscriminate attacks on civilians that characterized the war in Bosnia."¹⁴

On June 8th the EU foreign ministers jointly condemned "the burning of houses and the indiscriminate shelling of whole villages.... We are disturbed by reports that these attacks are beginning to constitute a new wave of ethnic cleansing ... We insist on an immediate stop to all violent action and call for the withdrawal of special police and army units."¹⁵

Even though Greece was reluctant, the EU imposed economic sanctions which freeze Yugoslav assets in member states and bans new investment in Serbia by those states. On the following day the US followed suit.

Also on June 9th, six Balkan countries -- Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania -- called for international action to stop the violence. They insisted that a situation which sends refugees flowing over the borders is more than an internal issue.

Although Russia has joined in with NATO and the OSCE in denouncing excessive and disproportionate use of force, it has continuously and repeatedly warned that any military action without the consent of the UN (where Russia has veto power) would be unacceptable. China has also warned against armed intervention and advocates political dialogue.

5. *Political Realignment In Kosovo.*

On 20 May the KLA surfaced from its underground operation. For the first time, KLA members were photographed and identified by name at a press conference. To end confusing reports, Jakup Krasniqi was on June 12th appointed the official spokesperson for the KLA. The KLA's announced goal is to create an independent nation composed of Albania and the ethnic Albanian territories of Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro.¹⁶

Rugova has insisted that, as president, he speaks for the KLA, and they do not need a representative at negotiations. Nevertheless, on June 14th Fehmi Agani, Rugova's No.2 man, admitted that negotiations must include the KLA. It was over the issue that some of Rugova's key people split from his party. Party vice president Hydajet Hyseni and writer Rexhep Qosja founded the Albanian Democratic Movement designed to unite the radicals. At this point Rugova finally admitted that he has no influence over the KLA.

¹⁴Associated Press dispatch, 6 June 1998.

¹⁵Agence France-Presse dispatch, 8 June 1998.

¹⁶Agence France-Presse dispatches: 4 July 1998, 11 July 1998, and 19 July 1998.

Qosja was elected head of the Albanian Democratic Movement. He supports independence and would like to see Kosovo united with Albania. He had once proposed taking up arms for independence, but since becoming a party leader he has toned down his position to "peaceful active resistance" -- as opposed to the "peaceful resistance" advocated by Rugova. Qosja's party is known for its links with the KLA.¹⁷

Adem Demaci's and his Parliamentary Party have now taken the compromise position of independence from Serbia as a third and equal entity in the Yugoslav federation (Balkania). He also has contacts with the KLA, and in June urged it to carry on "its struggle determinedly."¹⁸

ALIGNMENT OF POWER IN THE SOUTHERN BALKANS

The alignment of power on the lower Balkan peninsula is discrete and deadly. Other than the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which is struggling to mature, there is no universally-accepted regional grouping. But not all countries belong to the OSCE -- Serbia and Montenegro are suspended and Macedonia is only an observer because its membership has been blocked by Greece.

1. Spread of War to other Balkan Countries.

US special envoy Richard Holbrooke warned: "If [Kosovo] explodes, it could be even more dangerous than Bosnia because it could unravel the international boundaries in the area, with Albania, Macedonia, perhaps even Greece."¹⁹

Albania has promised to protect ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Albania has military cooperation agreements with Macedonia and Bulgaria. Bulgaria has also pledged to help Macedonia. On the other side, Romania could lean toward Serbia as an ally. Misha Glenny warned against ignoring a central truth in the Balkans: "Once the area begins to destabilize, a significant element in each national group in the region radicalizes in the hope of transforming a historical myth of nationhood into the reality of a nation-state."²⁰ The "reality of a nation-state" could be extended to creating a "Greater nation," whatever its name is.

2. Spread of War Beyond the Balkans.

Greece and Turkey make the situation especially dangerous. Turkey would side with Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo -- in 1992 Turkey signed an agreement with Albania for military cooperation. Turkey has promised to help Albania reconstruct its Pashalimani dockyard and in rebuilding the country's armed forces. Turkey also promised to donate 20 US-built F-5 fighter jets to Macedonia.

Greece would position itself with Serbia and, perhaps more pertinent, against Turkey. Greece is trying to cultivate relations with Albania as a neighbor and as a member of the EU (in which Turkey has been denied membership).

Turkey and Greece are both members of NATO, and have received weapons removed from central Europe. Under the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, these weapons

¹⁷Agence France-Presse dispatches, 5 July 1998.

¹⁸Agence France-Presse dispatch, 5 July 1998.

¹⁹Agence France-Presse dispatch, 7 June 1998.

²⁰Glenny

could be used to replace older weapons in NATO's southern flank. This "cascading," as it is called, did not supply Greece and Turkey with obsolete weapons. It modernized their armed forces with armaments deemed by the CFE Treaty to be aggressive. These two countries have also made many new purchases. The proliferation of weapons to Turkey and Greece wouldn't be nearly as dangerous if they were truly NATO allies. But they are enemies, each is trying to maximize diplomatic leverage.

3. *Hegemony Across the Aegean.*

It wouldn't take much to trip Greece and Turkey into war. They have clashed in recent years over: (1) the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus; (2) oil and mineral rights on the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea; (3) the territorial waters and fishing rights in the Aegean Sea; (4) civil rights for the ethnic Turk population in Thrace; (5) civil rights for the ethnic Greek population in Istanbul, and (6) a January 1996 dispute over the 10-acre islet of Imia off the Turkish coast in the Aegean Sea.

Current conditions are especially volatile because the ethnic-Greek Cyprus government has ordered S-300 air-defense missiles from Russia. Turkey says the missiles threaten its air power supremacy over Cyprus. Turkey also fears the anti-aircraft missiles might be converted to surface-to-surface missiles which would threaten the Turkish mainland. Turkey has vowed to prevent deployment with military action if necessary. Both Turkey and Greece have sent warplanes to Cyprus and observers fear that war may be imminent. "This is a rehearsal of an actual war that is very likely to break out later this year when S-300 missiles are deployed in Cyprus," said Ceyhun Erguven, a political analyst and lecturer at Ankara's Bilkent University, in June 1998. "Both sides are determined not to make any concessions."²¹

4. *A Rapid Intervention Force for the Balkans.*

Greece first advanced the idea of a rapid intervention force in 1997. In March 1998 Turkey offered to host such a force based in a Turkish town of Edirne near the Greek and Bulgarian borders. On the 18th of that month a meeting was held at Ankara with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey agreeing to such a force under NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.

Greece wants the force to be based in Greek territory and accused Turkey of stealing the idea. Greece attended the mid-April meeting in Romania. The force would be comprised of no more than 2000 troops and would be available for missions worldwide under mandate from world or regional organizations. No location for a headquarters was decided.

At the Albania meeting in May 1998, Italy and Slovenia joined the alliance. The group will meet again in Macedonia on September 26th. Still no decision on the headquarters location.

One must wonder what motivations are being exercised here. Are Turkey and Greece again vying for some kind of leadership in the region, or in administering a piece of the PfP program? Are the Balkan nations interested in drawing nearer to NATO for its supply of modern weaponry? The most important question is, would this unlikely alliance really hold together to truly maintain peace in the Balkans should it be called upon to do so?

SUPERPOWERS BEHIND THE ALIGNMENTS

Russia has historically supported Serbia. Both countries are ethnically Slavic and predominantly Eastern Orthodox Christian. When NATO aircraft bombed Serb artillery around

²¹Enginsoy.

Gorazde, in Bosnia, in 1994 the action became a major issue between Washington and Moscow. Russian President Boris Yeltsin stopped short of an ultimatum but insisted that he always be consulted before future actions of such drastic proportions.

Since the beginning of the Kosovo violence, debate has been ongoing within NATO on whether it should take military action. Russia has consistently opposed any outside use of force in Kosovo without UN approval. Since Russia has veto power in the UN Security Council, approval is not likely to be forthcoming.

The US maintains that UN approval is not necessary -- that NATO can act on its own. US Defense Secretary William S. Cohen said that suborning NATO to the UN is inadvisable and not necessary. But two weeks later, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan warned that NATO military action pertaining to Kosovo should first be sanctioned by the UN. France, Italy, Denmark, and Germany have since declared they will not approve NATO intervention without a UN mandate. So NATO threats are essentially meaningless.

It would be an extremely dangerous if the US decided to carry out air strikes alone as it was about to do earlier in 1998 with Iraq. Then there is also the question of what NATO would do if members Turkey and Greece became involved -- especially if they were on opposite sides. NATO would probably side with which Turkey was siding and Russia with Greece. This would not just be a new cold war. It could easily become a very warm or even a hot war.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

This section is taken principally from two reports: the June 1998 special report by the US Institute for Peace (USIP)²² and a 1998 report prepared by Alberto L'Abate for the Peace Embassy in Pristina, Kosovo.²³ The latter compiles and examines the recommendations of seven non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and brainstorms all options no matter how impossible they may seem. Since the solutions proposed by the two reports overlap considerably, they will be integrated here:

1. *Serbianization of Kosovo.*

Forced removal of some or all Kosovars and replacing them with Serbs. Serbia would like this option but it would not be popular with any other party. Only war and extreme force, combined with inaction by the international community, could accomplish this.

2. *Partition of Kosovo.*

The northern part would be absorbed by Serbia and the Serbs would want the larger part, including their historical sites and the prime natural resources. Partition could be accomplished in two ways:

- a. **Part to Serbia and part autonomous within Serbia.** This would require moving thousands of people to keep the ethnic grouping. It could be done only by force.
- b. **Part to Serbia and part independent.** This would also require relocation of much of the population. It would also require realignment of borders which is not supported by the international community. Again, this could only be accomplished by force.

²²*Kosovo Dialogue: Too Little, Too Late.*

²³*Preventing War In Kosovo To Save The Balkans From De-Stabilization.*

3. *Autonomy for Kosovo.*

This again has several aspects to consider:

- a. **Autonomous within Serbia.** This would be reverting to the previous condition which would only be acceptable to Serbia -- Milosevic has now offered to restore the autonomy he abolished in 1989. It would certainly be unacceptable to the Kosovars and the US said it would not agree to the status quo.
- b. **Autonomous within Yugoslavia.** A big issue here would be police and security. Kosovars would want control of it and Serbia wouldn't want to relinquish it.²⁴ But if that aspect could be worked out, this option would allow neutrality and demilitarization of Kosovo, as the Kosovars want.
- c. **Autonomous as an independent third entity in the Yugoslav federation.** Of all the proposed solutions this could be the most acceptable compromise. This Balkania, as advocated by Adem Demaci,²⁵ would then be more harmoniously divided along ethnic lines -- Albanian, Montenegrin, and Serbian -- but would not be easily accepted by the Serbs.

4. *Independence for Kosovo.*

Recognizing the Republic of Kosovo as a sovereign nation. This is the position of Rugova who also proposes that an independent Kosovo would have open borders (so the Serbs could visit their historic sites) and would renounce an army in return for protection by solid international agreements. (Undermining the latter, however, is Rugova's hint in July that the KLA should be part of an ethnic Albanian coalition government, understood to imply in the defense sector.²⁶) But this proposal is opposed by the international community as well as Serbia.

5. *Kosovo as part of a Confederation of the Southern Balkans.*

This stems from the feeling that Kosovo's ethnic problems cannot be separated from those of Macedonia and Albania, and is the announced goal of the KLA. This was also the original position of Adem Demaci and Rexhep Qosja before they became leaders of political parties. Such a confederation would be opposed by Serbia and would likely alienate Montenegro which is now opposed to war in Kosovo. The international community, rejecting any redrawn borders, would not support it.

A PROCESS FOR RESOLVING THE KOSOVO CRISIS.

All of the above proposals have serious obstacles. In overcoming them the parties should arrive at an interim agreement aimed at promoting ongoing dialogue toward a long-term settlement. Both sides must summon the courage to move first without waiting for the other, and to continue without an impasse or renewed violence. L'Abate has outlined a three-step process for arriving at an interim decision which will define the path toward a long-term solution. This paper will use L'Abate's process supplemented by USIP suggestions as well as others. The three steps are 1) confidence-building measures, 2) opening of dialogue and negotiation, and 3) an interim settlement.

²⁴*Kosovo Dialogue: Too Little, Too Late.*

²⁵See L'Abate-1. Also see Doder.

²⁶Agence France-Presse dispatch, 31 July 1998.

1. Confidence-Building Measures.

Some unilateral steps can be taken by both Kosovars and Serbs. They should accept basic principles that enhance subsequent progress (refrain from using force and recognizing the right of self-determination for the other ethnic group), accept the international standards for human rights and democracy, search for interim solutions that doesn't jeopardize the long-term plan, and be willing to accept participation of a third party (in both the dialogue phase and for verification of respect for human rights).

Unilateral steps possible for the Kosovars are to reaffirm their commitment to nonviolence, clarify their guarantees for the rights of the Serb minority in Kosovo (including international monitoring), put aside the discussion of independence while negotiating the interim agreement, and enter negotiations without a precondition of only accepting independence. This means that the Kosovar leaders will have to first unite in their stand.

Serbia could cease violating human rights, respect freedom of press and association, allow an international presence, eliminate martial law and gradually reduce the army and police presence in Kosovo, and recognize the Kosovar's right to self-government (including the security, civic, and educational elements).

There are also confidence-building steps available to the international community: put pressure on the Yugoslav federation to reopen the permanent mission of the OSCE, establish operational centers in Kosovo for international humanitarian organizations (such as the UNHCR and the International Red Cross) which are now serving the area from outside, use these humanitarian offices to encourage dialogue between Serbian and Kosovar leaders, acquire a better understanding of the importance of the problem and availability for long-term mediation, return to the region the OSCE mission for monitoring human rights, act as guarantors for the start of the process, and organize/participate in organisms that would assist in the process.

2. Opening of Dialogue and Negotiation.

The main obstacle here is Serbian opposition to outside mediation and participation. L'Abate says the international community should use positive incentives and negative sanctions to bend Milosevic's stand. Sanctions should be carefully applied so as not to harm the Serb people. To harm them with sanctions would be an abuse of their human right to basic necessities, and Milosevic would use that to rally the population behind him, as he has done previously.

The USIP made some good recommendations in this area. It recommended the OSCE as the international mediator, which seems best as the OSCE is more representative of all Europe than any other regional organization. The trouble is that Yugoslavia has been suspended from membership. It might be an incentive for Milosevic to accept OSCE mediation if Yugoslavia's membership were reinstated. As the USIP points out, ostracizing Yugoslavia hasn't accomplished anything anyway.

Another important element is that all parties, including the KLA, be represented during negotiations. Although Rugova has refused to recognize the KLA, and Milosevic refuses to talk to them, the consensus of the USIP working group is that the KLA is the driving force in Kosovo. The USIP recommends that the US start discreet dialogue with KLA leaders in an attempt to influence their activities and bring them to the negotiating table.

Another incentive mentioned in the USIP report is that maybe NATO should be deployed along Kosovo-Albanian border in Albania. It would seem better that the UN undertake that mission. When the UN presence in Macedonia is renewed, it could be extended to include Albania.

3. The Interim Agreement.

This is the document that must emerge from initial dialogue. It should aim at continuing cooperation toward redefining the long-term status of Kosovo and the structure of Yugoslavia..

L'Abate proposes many elements that could be included in this interim settlement. Cultural and educational institutions could go back under the control of Kosovars. Life should be normalized in Kosovo by restoring public institutions and giving jobs back to those who lost them for political reasons. The Kosovars could agree to participate in Yugoslav elections which should be conducted by certain standards and overseen by the OSCE. There could also be the start of a long-term process for economic integration of the entire region.

At the start of negotiations it should be agreed that if an interim settlement has not been reached in, say, a couple years the parties should submit to binding arbitration. The possibilities are manifold and these are merely a few suggestions

SUMMING IT ALL UP

War in the southern Balkans exposes the impotence of the United Nations and NATO as peacekeepers. It bares the toothless gums of the EU and OSCE as regional organizations. It illustrates the apathy in world opinion in the face of violent atrocities. But most of all, it highlights the ignorance of humanity which tenaciously clings to military might in fulfilling its territorial imperative.

If war spreads in the southern Balkans, it will involve many countries. The US will be pitted against Russia -- either on the sidelines or in the fray. Re-emergence of hostilities between the nuclear superpowers could, at the most optimistic outcome, aggravate another cold-war standoff. That would give a tremendous boost to the weapons business, and accelerate the proliferation of weapons, but it would not be in the best interests of the word community.

Perhaps the best medium for preventing further carnage on the Balkan peninsula is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which best represents all of Europe. Furthermore, the OSCE has not yet chosen either its instrument or policy for regional security. It is still possible for it to adopt a non-military defense, or at least a not-exclusively-military defense. Tasos Kokkinides and Bronwyn Brady have written an excellent paper for the British-American Security Information Council (BASIC) on this subject.²⁷ It is highly recommended for further reading.

The tendency of national governments is to immediately deploy troops when a crisis occurs. There is a serious lack of forethought to employing less violent means at an earlier stage. In the Balkans there is at least the opportunity to find a peaceful solution before the crisis spreads, or wreaks further havoc in Kosovo itself.

Howard Clark prepared an insightful analysis of the nonviolent movement in Kosovo.²⁸ He pointed out that nonviolence was successful until the Kosovars' shadow government began to monopolize initiative.²⁹ Kenneth Kaunda, former president of Zambia, made some sad observations on how nonviolence works well for liberation movements but is not practical when liberation is

²⁷See Kokkinides and Brady.

²⁸See Clark.

²⁹Clark, modified by later correspondence.

achieved and a government installed.³⁰ That is probably due to lack of development of nonviolent attitudes in government, and placing traditional government roles before nonviolent initiative. It is something the Kosovars might overcome as they have promised open borders and have renounced an army. At any rate, this difficult liberation-to-government transition is something to be aware of.

Clark observes: "Many now conclude that the nonviolent struggle [in Kosovo] has failed, that at most it has postponed rather than prevented war. My own view is that, in adverse conditions, the policy of nonviolence has saved Kosovo from a much worse fate, has sustained the people, and has gained time that was not used either by Kosovo's own leaders or by foreign governments."³¹ Continuation of an active nonviolent campaign in Kosovo is still crucial. But now it must incorporate the process toward dialogue and an interim settlement in order to prevent a major war in southeaster Europe, and possibly wider.

Active nonviolence can be practiced through the unilateral moves described above as confidence-building measures. In this campaign one can take heart that there is interest in active nonviolence on both sides. Note the success of nonviolent actions for 89 days by Serbs in Belgrade during the winter of 1996-1997. Conditions were somewhat similar to Kosovo and it broke the Serb regime's monopoly on power. In June 1998 there were demonstrations in Belgrade by the parents of new Yugoslav Army recruits who may have been sent to Kosovo. The long-present Women in Black are still active in Belgrade, as are other peace and justice organizations. Furthermore, the May 1998 initial attempt at dialogue between Kosovars and Serbs showed that dialogue is possible and, with implementation of the confidence-building measures, could be successful.

The Kosovars have a strong unity in the common cause for some form of independence. That same type of unity was observed during the successful People Power revolution to oust Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos during the 1980s. But when liberation was actually achieved in those islands, unity fell apart as the different factions pursued their various and often conflicting goals. That is another pitfall the Kosovars should be aware of and lay the groundwork to overcome.

Perhaps the most important role in obtaining a just and peaceful; solution to Kosovo's problems rests with the world community. People can pressure their leaders to seek such a solution. More than words and letters will certainly be necessary. It was massive peaceful demonstrations that ended the Vietnam war. It was a nation-wide emergency response network threatening nonviolent non-cooperation with government that prevented the US invasion of Nicaragua. And it can be a huge -- even global -- nonviolent campaign that brings a meaningful peace to Kosovo.

Far from being doomed to defeat, the now-ravaged Kosovo can be transformed into a liberated, peaceful and non-militant country -- an example for the rest of the world. It will not be easy and it will take effort by a great many people in the international community, but it can be done. Recognizing this, the world should be anxious to help create that example. Governments, NGOs and grass roots people, all of them, can fill a role in a successful outcome.

It is also important that this time we learn a lesson for the future. So far no one has found a way to jump into a hot cauldron of violence and quickly apply a purely non-military solution. There have been small successes but nothing on a large scale. To make nonviolence a national policy it must be nourished from the start, and from deep in the roots. It must be ingrained in public attitudes and national values. It is never too early to start that process.

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³⁰See Kaunda.

³¹Clark

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GLOSSARY

CE	Christian Era. A more ecumenical designation than AD (Anno Domini -- in the year of our lord).
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe.
Contact Group	Representatives from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United States who seek to negotiate peace in the Balkans.
EU	European Union. 15 members -- Austria, Belgium, Britain, Finland, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia.
GAO	General Accounting Office (US).
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army (Western designation).
Kosovars	Ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo.
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (16 members -- Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United States).
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization.
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (which includes all 16 members of NATO as well as other western and eastern European countries along with former Soviet republics). Its 52 members are Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tadjikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United States, and Uzbekistan. Macedonia is an observer and rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is a suspended member.
UCK	Kosovo Liberation Army (Kosovo designation).
UN	United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees.
US United States
USIP United States Institute for Peace.

LEADERS IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

Albania -- Rexhep Meidani, president.
 Fatos Nano, prime minister.
 Pascal Milo, foreign minister.
 Ilir Bocka, defense minister.
Bulgaria -- Petar Stoyanov, president.
Greece -- Costas Simitis, prime minister.
Kosovo -- Ibrahim Rugova, president of shadow government and leader of the Kosovo Democratic League.
 Adem Demaci, leader of Kosovo Parliamentary Party.
 Rexhep Qosja, leader of Albanian Democratic Movement.
 Jakup Krasniqi, spokesperson for Kosovo Liberation Army.
Macedonia -- Kiro Gligorov, president.
 Branko Crvenkovski, prime minister.
 Nevzat Halili, leading ethnic Albanian radical in western Macedonia.
Romania -- Emil Constantinesco, president.
Turkey -- Suleyman Demirel, president.
 Mesut Yilmaz, prime minister.
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) -- Slobodan Milosevic, president of Yugoslavia.
 Momir Bulatovic, prime minister of Yugoslavia.
 Milo Djukanovic, president of Montenegro.
 Filip Vujanovic, prime minister.
 Milan Milutinovic, president of Serbia.
 Mirko Marjanovic, prime minister of Serbia.