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PEACE IN BOSNIA:

UNDERSTANDING THE DAYTON ACCORDS

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The 1995 General Framework Agreement For Peace In Bosnia And Herzegovina and its supporting annexes, commonly called the Dayton Accords (or merely Accords), was initialed in Dayton, Ohio on 21 November 1995 and formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. The signatories are President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, and President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia on behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (present-day or rump Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia and Montenegro). Milosevic also represented the Bosnian Serbs because their leader, Radovan Karadzic, an indicted war criminal, could not participate.

These Accords have been welcomed by almost everyone as an end to the slaughter that has taken place over the past four years. But it must be remembered that two very high diplomatic compromises have been made to stop the killing. First, a dangerous precedent has been set in legitimizing aggression and atrocities. These have been committed by all parties to the conflict and will, hopefully, be fairly and thoroughly addressed before the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Haig (established in 1993 for the former Yugoslavia and headed by Justice Richard Goldstone of South Africa). Second, international hegemony has caused the UN to be pushed aside in favor of NATO as the instrument for resolving international conflicts. If the world community, the economic powers in particular, had been able to place self-serving interests second to human suffering the conflict could have been resolved sooner, if not avoided altogether.

Another important point is that the Dayton Accords are based entirely on the ongoing federation between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats. It is essential to success that this federation continue to exist. A point of concern here is the agreement signed on 23 August 1996 between Croatia and rump Yugoslavia in which they agreed to mutual recognition and established diplomatic relations. Although this is a welcome event in that it sets aside the original provocation of the war, it raises questions about the stability of the Muslim-Croat federation.

DAYTON AGREEMENT MAP



The city of Mostar, unified in name only, epitomizes the hatred between Muslims and Croats. Military stabilization must not be considered merely between the Muslim-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs. It is a three-pronged effort among Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. Should Muslim-Croat hos-

tilities again break out in Mostar or elsewhere, the federation -- along with the entire Dayton peace process -- will go up in smoke. With these thoughts in mind, let us go on to examine the Accords.

The Dayton Accords divide Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter called Bosnia except in proper

Source: NATO Website

government titles) into two approximately equal areas --

ZONES OF OPERATION



ZONES OF OPERATION



Source: NATO Website

US Sector headquarters in Tuzla.

British Sector headquarters in Banja Luka.

French Sector headquarters in Sarajevo.

51 percent controlled by the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation) and 49 percent by the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska). These two entities are combined under a Central Government called the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Accords consist of eleven Articles with eleven Annexes, one having two parts. But basically, the Dayton Accords have three aspects: (a) the NATO-led military peacekeeping force, (b) the European responsibility to establish a functioning government and economy, and (c) a military stabilization effort.

A. THE NATO-LED PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

Called the military aspect of the Accords, NATO's task is important but much more limited and easier to accomplish than the other two. It is the only aspect over which NATO has authority although not all participants belong to NATO.

NATO received its grant of authority from the United Nations, which created a multinational force to implement the Dayton Accords. This 34-nation Implementation Force (IFOR) was charged with enforcing the cease fire and providing a secure environment in which the other aspects of the Dayton Accords could take place. Within the limits of its military task and available resources, IFOR was also authorized to perform supporting roles such as assisting in humanitarian missions, responding appropriately to deliberate violence, and helping to create conditions for a free and fair election -- but only if these roles did not jeopardize IFOR's primary mission.

Britain, France and the US each have charge of a geographic division and each patrol about a third of the 620 miles of boundary demarcation line between the former warring parties. The US commitment to IFOR was only until December 1996. But if the US had pulled out of Bosnia at that time other aspects of the Accords would never have been completed. Longer military policing is required to prevent another outbreak of war. What appeared to be shaping up, however, was another round in the hegemonic struggle between France and the US for influence in Europe. IFOR itself was an outgrowth of that struggle. It was the first out-of-area activity, and such activity is now NATO's only justification to exist.

NATO is the United States' medium for influence in Europe. With no threat remaining in the area of NATO's 16-nation membership since the cold war ended, a new purpose for NATO had to be created in order for the US to retain its influence. Out-of-area peacekeeping missions were the answer. Consequently, the US did not adequately support United Nations efforts in Bosnia, of which France was a big part, and instead pushed for NATO involvement. That led to brokering the Dayton Peace Accords and creating IFOR.

France has for decades presented a subtle challenge to US-dominated NATO through a military alliance called the Western European Union (WEU) -- not to be confused with the 15-nation European Union. WEU's ten members also belong to NATO. In addition the WEU has three associate members and an observer which are also NATO members. The only NATO members not in some manner affiliated with the French-dominated WEU are the US and Canada.¹

To keep from being completely squeezed out of the picture the US had to agree to the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) initiative which would allow the European members of NATO -- that is, the WEU -- to use NATO assets for regional missions without US and Canadian participation.

¹For a more thorough discussion of NATO-WEU competition see PLRC-941107A.

These assets could include large transport aircraft, air support aircraft, communications systems, and satellite data. The CJTF concept was endorsed by NATO foreign ministers in Berlin on 3 June 1996. However, there is still debate on how US assets earmarked for NATO will be used -- particularly communications links and heavy-lift aircraft.

France and Britain have had large peacekeeping contingents in Bosnia since 1992 -- first under the United Nations and now under NATO. In October 1995 France and Britain reaffirmed their role as nuclear powers and agreed to greater cooperation toward a European policy for defense and international affairs. On 15 May 1996 the two nations announced their resolve to further strengthen their military ties through a joint commission aimed at improving the significant contribution both countries have already made to peacekeeping operations.

Also in May 1996, WEU ministers agreed to set up a political and military situation center at WEU headquarters in Brussels. With CJTF operations approved, the WEU planned to declare itself operational by the end of 1996.

By 19 July 1996 the US had 22,140 military personnel deployed in support of IFOR -- 16,175 in Bosnia, 1,354 in Croatia, and 4,611 divided between Hungary and Italy. US costs to support IFOR for one year were estimated at \$3 billion and rising.

After much stonewalling, and immediately after winning the November elections, the Clinton administration finally announced on 15 November 1996 that US troops would participate in a follow-on mission to IFOR, known as the Stabilization Force. Some 8,500 US soldiers will stay in Bosnia until at least July 1998. NATO has received an 18-month UN mandate for the Stabilization Force (SFOR) which will have some 31,000 troops total. Germany also will send up to 3,000 soldiers to Bosnia as part of this international peacekeeping mission. That is the fourth largest contingent from more than two dozen countries.

Meanwhile, Carl Bildt, High Representative in charge of carrying out the Dayton Accords (to be discussed below), said in early September that there was no chance of integrating the warring entities unless American ground troops stayed in Bosnia "at least until September 1998."² Perhaps President Clinton's "at least July 1998" date may be extended.

Newly appointed US Defense secretary William Cohen, on the other hand, announced on 9 March 1997 that US troops would be out of Bosnia on schedule in June 1998. It is difficult to tell if Cohen, a former republican senator who had been critical of the Clinton administration's Bosnia policy, is speaking for the administration or for himself.

B. ESTABLISHING A FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMY.

This so-called civilian aspect of the Dayton Accords is led by Europeans and administered through a High Representative appointed according to UN Security Council resolutions. It includes implementing a new constitution, supervising elections, addressing human rights problems, repatriating refugees, rebuilding infrastructure, and establishing an International Police Task Force.

Former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt was designated the first High Representative. A Spaniard, Carlos Westendorp, took over as the EU High Representative in June 1997. The High Representative reports to a steering committee and also chairs a Joint Civilian Commission comprised of senior political representatives of the parties to the Accords, the NATO commander in Bosnia, and

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representatives of civilian organizations **B** but has no authority over NATO.

Supervising elections and addressing human rights problems were assigned to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) -- the most widely represented regional organization in Europe. It is important that it be properly funded and supported. US Ambassador Robert Frowick has been appointed as OSCE Mission Chief.

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund estimate that Bosnia will require \$6 billion in outside help through 1998 -- half from donor nations (US, Europe, Japan) and the remainder from international lending institutions, debt write-offs, and foreign investment. The US plans to donate 10 percent of the total, or \$600 million (\$200 million a year for three years). However, the Clinton administration plans to spend \$539 million through 30 September 1996 to support implementation of the civilian aspect.

1. *The Constitution.*

Provisions for a new Constitution are set forth in the Accords, and was adopted upon signature in Paris. It provides that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Central Government) continue as a sovereign nation consisting of two Entities: the Federation and Republika Srpska. The Central Government has a three-member Presidency, a two-chamber legislature, and a constitutional court. Direct elections are held for the Presidency and one of the legislative chambers. No person indicted or convicted of war crimes may hold any public office in Bosnia.

Representation in the Central Government will be 2:1 in favor of the Federation. However, no ethnic group -- Muslim, Croat, or Serb -- may be outvoted except with international involvement. The Federation and Republika Srpska have agreed to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes, and they have agreed to design and implement a system of arbitration.

The Constitution provides for the protection of human rights and freedom of movement for people, goods, capital, and services throughout Bosnia. Neither Entity is to have control at the inter-Entity border line separating them.

The Central Government will also have responsibilities for foreign policy, foreign trade, air traffic control, transportation, communications, setting up a central bank and monetary system, and other areas agreed upon.

The Entities are allowed to enter into agreements with other states and international organizations, provided these agreements do not threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Central Government. The Entities will also provide their own law enforcement and military security in conformance with the Accords. Military coordination will take place through a committee including members of the Presidency.

2. *Elections.*

Elections will be at four levels: National, Entity, Cantonal, and Municipal.

\$ National elections will be for the central government's three-person presidency (one each Muslim, Croat and Serb) and the 42-seat House of Representatives, ethnically balanced in thirds. The presidential candidate receiving the most votes will be Chairman of the Presidency. Members of the other house in the central government's parliament, the House of People, are appointed by the Federation's House of People

and Republika Srpska's National Assembly.


- \$ **Entity elections** on the Federation side will be for the 140 seats in a Federation House of Representatives. This popularly-elected house and the Federation's appointed House of People choose the Federation President. On the Republika Srpska side, Entity elections are for the Republic President and the 140-seats in the republic's National Assembly.
- \$ **Cantonal elections** take place on the Federation side only and are somewhat comparable to county elections in the US. These Cantons appoint members to the Federation's House of People.
- \$ **Municipal elections** are for city officials and governments in 109 municipalities.

On 30 January 1996 the OSCE set up the Provisional Election Commission composed of Bosnian Muslim, Serb, and Croat members along with international representatives and election experts. This Commission established accurate voter rolls, arranged for absentee voting, set fair media campaigning rules, and monitored the elections. This Commission also adopted a framework electoral code which, among other things, established the basis for winning elections, determined the composition of the ballot, and outlined the approach for voter and political parties registration.

All Bosnian citizens 18 years and older are eligible to vote. Bosnian citizens are those listed in the 1991 Bosnian census. Refugees and displaced persons have the right to vote in their original place of residence if they choose, or by absentee ballot. Eligible voters were estimated at 2.9 million. Some 600,000 people have registered from outside the country -- about 10,000 each in Germany and the US, and something like 200,000 in Serbia.

Elections took place on 14 September 1996 for the Presidency and House of Representatives of the Central Government, for the House of Representatives of the Federation, for the National Assembly and Presidency of Republika Srpska.

National, Entity and Cantonal elections were held on schedule. The OSCE supervised the preparation and conduct of these elections, including a



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secret ballot and freedom of expression during the campaign. Election day was chaotic but relatively peaceful under the watchful eye of heavily-armed NATO troops. Turnout was estimated at between 60 and 70 percent but only about 24,000 people crossed the ethnic lines (20,000 Muslims and Croats, and 4,000 Serbs) to vote in their former place of residence -- fewer than expected. Another report by UN official Alexander Ivanko said only 13,500 Muslims and Croats, out of a possible 150,000, voted in or near villages from which they had been driven during the war.³

Exactly how impartial and fair the voting was is hard to determine, but widespread discrepancies have been reported across the board by the OSCE. One senior United Nations aid official commented: "There is an enormous amount of back-slapping going on by all sides of the international community here to put the most positive spin on the vote. We are all being told to report only the good side and don't dwell on the bad."⁴

The actual results, however, were disappointing and reflected a victory for the forces that started the war and ethnic cleansing in the first place. Nationalist parties in all three ethnic divisions retain their political hold. Chairmanship of the three-person Presidency went to Alija Izetbegovic with 724,199 votes. He is the only one in the Presidency who favors unity but is also an Islamic hard-liner with close ties to Iran. Next was Bosnian Serb separatist leader Momcilo Krajisnic with 690,373 votes. He is a former senior deputy to war criminal Radovan Karadzic. The third co-president elected was Kresimer Subak with 294,300 votes, candidate of the ultra-nationalist Croat Democratic Union.

Municipal elections are another matter..On August 27th elections for local offices were postponed until November because of massive registration irregularities at the local level. Then on October 22nd they were postponed again until some time in 1997. This postponement was blamed on political problems on all sides. OSCE Mission Chief Robert Frowick said he hopes the municipal elections will take place between April and June 1997. Later it became June or July, and then mid-July. On 6 March 1997 the OSCE confirmed that municipal elections will be held the following September 13-14th, a year later than originally scheduled.

The next round of National, Entity and Cantonal elections are set for September 1998, a year after the municipal elections.

3. Human Rights.

The OSCE is tasked to monitor human rights and fundamental freedoms for all people in Bosnia. It has formed a Commission on Human Rights, consisting of a Human Rights Ombudsman and a Human Rights Chamber (court). Ms. Gret Haller of Switzerland has been appointed Ombudsman. She is authorized to investigate human rights violations, issue findings, and bring proceedings before the Human Rights Chamber. The Chamber then hears and decides human rights claims and issues binding decisions. Its 14 members come from the parties to the Accords and the Council of Europe.

All parties to the Accords have agreed to grant the OSCE, UN human rights agencies, the International Tribunal, and other organizations full access to monitor the human rights situation.

³Cited in *Mercury News*, 17 September 1996, p. 9A.

⁴Cited in *Mercury News*, 16 September 1996, p.5A.

Somewhat related to human rights, the Accords specify that a Commission to Preserve National Monuments be established to designate as national monuments any movable or immovable property of great importance to a group of people with common cultural, historic, religious or ethnic heritage. The Federation and Republika Srpska are then to take appropriate legal, technical, financial, and other measures to protect and conserve those national monuments.

4. *Refugees and Displaced Persons.*

The Accords grant refugees and displaced persons the right to safely return home and regain lost property, or to obtain just compensation. A Commission on Displaced Persons and Refugees is the final authority on whether to return real property or issue compensation. Parties to the Accords agree to cooperate with the International Red Cross in finding all missing persons.

The Accords do not address the issue of Serbian refugees in Bosnia, mostly around Banja Luka, from the Krajina area of Croatia. They should also be guaranteed a safe return to that country.

5. *Rebuilding Infrastructure.*

NATO Secretary General Javier Solana explained that success in the Balkans depends on making "a real difference in the everyday lives of ordinary Bosnians before NATO departs. They have to begin to see a tangible improvement in their surroundings -- rebuilt roads and bridges, reopened schools and factories."⁵

A Bosnia and Herzegovina Transportation Corporation was established under the Accords to organize and operate roads, railways, and ports. A Commission on Public Corporations, with a chairman appointed by the president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, was also created to examine establishment of more Public Corporations to operate other joint facilities, such as utilities and postal service.

The London Peace Implementation Conference, attended by more than four dozen countries and international agencies, resolved on 5 December 1996 that aid to Bosnia was conditional on a more serious commitment to democratic reforms and apprehending indicted war crimes suspects. Although the international community has pledged \$1.8 billion to help rebuild that war-torn country, it called for better policing, more determined prosecution of war criminals, greater freedom of movement, and repatriation of more than 2 million refugees.

6. *International Police Task Force.*

UN Security Council Resolution 1035 authorizes a one-year International Police Task Force (IPTF) mission as a UN Civilian Police operation in Bosnia. It involves 1,721 international police monitors from 38 countries. The US planned to send 200 experienced officers and contribute \$80.7 million through September 1996 (\$30 million for cost of the 200 US monitors, \$20 million to train local police, and \$30.7 million toward general UN operational costs).

The UN Secretary General appointed Peter Fitzgerald as IPTF Commissioner. He is from Ireland with UN Civilian Police experience in Cambodia, Namibia, and El Salvador. His deputy is Robert Wasserman, former chief of staff for the US Office of National Drug Control Policy.

Purpose of the IPTF is to develop effective local law enforcement and respect for human

⁵Solana.

rights. Specific functions include monitoring, on-the-job training, advising local police, and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities. As far as correcting deficiencies, the IPTF Commissioner can only notify the High Representative and inform the NATO Commander for Bosnia. The IPTF also reports any credible information on human rights violations to the Human Rights Commission, the International Tribunal, or other appropriate organizations.

C. THE MILITARY STABILIZATION EFFORT.

The purpose of military stabilization is to establish an arms control program, and this responsibility has also been assigned to the OSCE. NATO participates through such actions as enforcing the arms embargo but it is not a task of NATO to establish military stabilization. Regional stabilization in the former Yugoslavia is a European task which could best be accomplished by offering economic incentives. Instead, it seems to be an opening to profit from arms sales.

Certain parts of the military aspect had to be in place before an arms control agreement can be implemented: foreign combatant forces out of Bosnia; heavy weapons and forces withdrawn to cantonment areas and barracks, and forces which cannot be accommodated there demobilized; and all combatant and civilian prisoners of war exchanged. These have been mostly accomplished.

Another prelude to military stabilization, as specified in the Accords and under OSCE auspices, is that the Central Government, the Federation, and Republika Srpska negotiate confidence-building measures which include restrictions on military deployment and exercises, notification of military activities, and exchange of data.

Then the Accords get down to the heart of the matter. They specify that these three Bosnian entities (Central Government, Federation, and Republika Srpska), along with Croatia and rump Yugoslavia, do not import heavy weapons, heavy weapons ammunition, mines, military aircraft, or helicopters for six months. Furthermore, within six months these five parties should negotiate numerical limits for tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters.

Negotiations began on 4 January 1996. Then on 14 June 1996, exactly six months to the day after signing the Accords, the

Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control was signed in Florence, Italy by the five specified parties. The goal of this agreement should have been to draw down military forces to a level of parity. Instead, it opened the door to a lucrative arms market in the Balkans. Figure-3 shows the agreed limits with holdings at the time of signing in parentheses. An increase over current inventory is indicated with an asterisk.

The parties to the Agreement also specified voluntary limits on military personnel. The Federation settled at 115,000 and Republika Srpska at 56,000 -- a 2:1 ratio. Rump Yugoslavia and Croatia agreed to 124,339 and 65,000 respectively. The combination of rump Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska is 180,339, while the combination of Croatia and the Federation is 180,000. Two significant armies still face each other in an unstable land.

Looking at Figure-1, rump Yugoslavia is allowed a significant increase in tanks and armored combat vehicles. Their current holdings are roughly halved in the other three categories. Source of its allowed build-up could come from reductions in Republika Srpska equipment (possibly a return of equipment previously loaned) and/or from Russia. Croatia's allowed increase in armored combat

vehicles, combat aircraft, and helicopters will likely come from some European nation. Republika Srpska will be cut drastically in the first three categories although they are allowed one more combat aircraft and seven helicopters. These will undoubtedly come from rump Yugoslavia.

The biggest buildup will be in the Muslim-Croat Federation which will have a 2:1 advantage over Republika Srpska. The US has been waiting in the wings with an \$800-million "Train and Equip" program, which began in Sarajevo on 16 July 1996. The Pentagon is prepared to immediately move \$98.4 million worth of existing US equipment to the Bosnian government. Another \$200,000 in 1996 funds is earmarked to train Bosnian military officers in the United States. Most of the training will be managed by Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) in Alexandria, Virginia -- an organization of retired military who provide consultation to smaller countries, and have already provided military advice in the Balkans.

FIGURE-1

AGREED LIMITS FOR HEAVY WEAPONS AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT

	TANKS	ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES	ARTILLERY towed & motorized	COMBAT AIRCRAFT	ATTACK HELICOPTERS	
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA	1025 * (639)	850 * (667)	3750 (7058)	155 (282)	53 (110)	
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA	410 (550)	340 * (237)	1500 (1799)	62 * (28)	21 * (5)	
: Federation	273 *	227 *	1000 *	41 *	14 *	
BOSNIA :	(131)	(115)	(932)	(3)	(0)	
AND :						
HERZE- : Bos. Serbs	137	113	500	21 *	7 *	
GOVINA :	(370)	(295)	(1706)	(20)	(0)	
:						
: TOTAL	410	340	1500	62 *	21 *	
:	(501)	(410)	(2638)	(23)	(0)	

Source: Agreed quantities are from the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control. December 1995 declared holdings (in parentheses) are from BASIC Paper #14, p. 3.

* indicates an increase over current inventory.

On the broader scale, it should be noted that the Dayton Accords mandate the OSCE to

organize and conduct negotiations to establish a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia. But current military stabilization efforts only concern the three countries which are party to the Accords. To bring greater stability to all of the former Yugoslavia, military stabilization should also encompass Slovenia and Macedonia. Slovenia, for instance, intends to spend up to \$493 million by the end of 1998 to upgrade its military with mostly US equipment, including new F-16 jet fighters. This does help to stabilize the region.

Ambassador James W. Pardew, Jr. is the Special Representative from the US for military stabilization in the Balkans. Retired Major General William M. Boyce will manage the military stabilization project for MPRI from his Sarajevo office. US allies are also assisting in the "Train and Equip" program -- Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, and Brunei. More supporters are being sought.

Some 170 former US Army leaders will work under Maj. Gen. Boyce to train the Federation's military forces. Most of the training will take place in Bosnia although some individual officers will get specific training at US bases, presumably in the US. Muslim leaders are also being trained in Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

In spite of some non-European support, the US plan has received stiff criticism from European allies who say that training and equipping the Bosnian army runs counter to the spirit of the Dayton Accords -- that all parties should support reducing the level of armaments held by the warring parties.

Europeans say the American plan can wreck the already slender chances of genuine reconciliation and that training and equipping will play into the hands of hardliners of all ethnic groups, triggering a fresh arms race in the region. This dissension has been published in European newspapers but seems to be down-played by the American press.

On 24 October 1996, the US announced it was suspending military aid to Bosnia until that government's deputy defense minister, Hasan Cengic, was removed. Cengic was suspected of having ties with Iran. The US had already delivered 15 helicopters and 50,000 small arms, and another large shipment was pending. The following November 19th the Bosnian government complied and US arms shipments continued.

Nevertheless, there is strong suspicion that the Bosnian Muslims are trying to build a well-equipped army outside the Muslim-Croat Federation. An unnamed senior NATO official reportedly said that, in the last week of August 1996, forty 155-millimeter howitzers, undeclared by the Bosnian government, were shipped disassembled in crates through the southern Croatian port of Ploce, then through Mostar to the Muslim-controlled town of Zenica.⁶ The official is also reported as saying that Turkey and Malaysia helped in the shipment and that the Bosnian government has signed secret arms agreements with Iran, Turkey and Malaysia.

Mine removal is another area under the heading of Military Stabilization. US Special Representative James Pardew said on 7 February 1997 that this effort is "critically short." He said, "What you have in Bosnia are young people poking around in the ground with bayonets. That is no way to clear mines."⁷ He plans to ask NATO nations to come up with more money and equipment

⁶*Mercury News*, 8 November 1996, p. 18A.

⁷Cited in *Defense News*, 10 February 1997, p. 2.

for this purpose.

D. UNRESOLVED ISSUES.

One key unresolved issue in the Dayton Accords is what to do with the city of Brcko (pronounced Burch-ko) which controls the narrow corridor joining the two parts of Republika Srpska, and which lies on the bank of the Sava River. Instead, an American, Roberts Owen, was assigned to head a three-member arbitration panel which will rule on who controls the city. Both entities agreed to accept arbitration.

The Serbs were left in control of the area, claiming that since Brcko separates the two parts of Republika Srpska it would be contrary to the Dayton Accords to put the city in Federation hands. But Muslims counter that before the war Brcko was predominantly Muslim, and that it would reward aggression and ethnic cleansing if the city was awarded to the Serbs. In addition, the Muslims claim they need access to the Sava River through Brcko for trade. So, after many months of fruitless negotiations the arbitration panel announced on 15 February 1997 that Brcko will remain in Serb hands for another year, and that an international supervisor will monitor administration of the city, the return of refugees, and the opening of roads through the city to Muslim and Croat travelers. At the end of a year the international supervisor will decide who will finally control the city.

Brcko epitomizes many of the problems left unresolved at Dayton, and determining who controls that town could be the deciding factor in:

- \$ Whether Bosnia will be one country or more.
- \$ Whether Muslim refugees will be allowed to return to their former homes.
- \$ Will the Balkan countries be able to live in harmony, or are the seeds germinating for a future war.

E. CONCLUSION.

The Dayton Accords offer encouragement but making a unified nation out of a divided country is harder than signing a piece of paper. In a land where law and order has completely broken down, where atrocities have been committed by all sides, where ethnic cleansing is still a live issue, and where rabid hatreds abound, we cannot expect immediate harmony. Conditions at the six-month point of the Accords was summarized at the 13 June 1996 IFOR briefing in Sarajevo by Colum Murphy of the High Representative's office:

The fact of the matter is that today Bosnia is still a society coming apart -- not a society starting to come back together. Nor are human rights either adequately protected or promoted. The Federation is not building the structures envisaged... It is rather developing toward a strategic partnership ... in the form of a confederation between two of the three communities in Bosnia.

... on the lower, local level tensions and distrust are strong. We do not see any coming together of communities, rather the contrary. Increasingly, we see the different parties advocating their own version of the ... Peace Agreement. The

Bosnian Muslim side stresses freedom-of-movement issues and the right of return of refugees and displaced persons while increasingly questioning the legality of [Republika Srpska] and the long-term validity of the political structures of the Peace Agreement.

The Bosnian Serb side, on the other hand, stresses the Entity political structures of the Peace Agreement but wants to transform the [inter-Entity border line] into a tightly-controlled state border, effectively denying freedom of movement and the right of return, thus making [Republika Srpska] as much of a completely independent Entity as possible. They want a partitioned Bosnia... For both of them peace is still the continuation of war by other means -- not the reconciliation that would be the true spirit of Dayton and Paris.

In terms of the big picture, the High Representative believes that regional issues will become increasingly important. Kosovo is a major crisis waiting to happen. Serbia itself may well be heading for a melt-down with profound consequences. We also watch developments on Croatia with concerns as to its influence on [the Mostar area] and on the region. Albania is a cause for worry.⁸

That description still fits today, and tempts one toward despair. But it is reality which must be met head on. If the Accords fail there will certainly be a return to war which will likely spread throughout the Balkans and beyond. The healing process will take a long, long time. It will require much help, patience, and persistence from concerned people within and outside the area. When ordinary people in Bosnia begin to see a real difference in their everyday lives, success will become more apparent. It is a formidable challenge, but meeting that challenge is a serious responsibility for all peace-loving people in the international community.

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GLOSSARY

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force.

DOD US Department of Defense.

GAO US General Accounting Office.

IFOR Implementation FORce of NATO in Bosnia.

IPTF International Police Task Force.

MPRI Military Professional Resources Inc.

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Its 16 members are Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and United States.

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its 52 members are Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tadjikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United States, and Uzbekistan. Macedonia is an observer and rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is a suspended member.

SFOR Stabilization FORce of NATO in Bosnia.

WEU Western European Union. Its ten members are Belgium, Britain, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Iceland, Norway and Turkey are associate members and Denmark is an observer.