

PLRC *Pacific Life Research Center*

631 Kiely Boulevard * Santa Clara, CA 95051 * Phone 408/248-1815 * Fax 408/985-9716 * E-mail bob@plrc.org
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HEGEMONY IN EUROPE: PART 1 -- THE SUBTLETIES OF POLITICAL COMPETITION

Compiled by Bob Aldridge

(NOTE: THIS IS PART 1 OF A TWO-PART PAPER ON "HEGEMONY IN EUROPE.")
(PART 2 IS SUBTITLED "THE INTRICACIES OF ECONOMIC COMPETITION.")

The United Nations (UN) Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October of that same year. This set up the UN Security Council with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, and is the paramount decision-making body of the UN. The Security Council is composed of 15 member states -- five of whom are permanent and ten that rotate periodically. Decisions are made by majority vote except that the five permanent members have veto power over any resolution passed. Permanent membership at present coincides with the five declared nuclear powers -- Britain, China, France, Russia and the US.

Because of its economic and military strength, the US has tremendous influence over the UN Security Council. Should Japan and Germany be admitted as permanent members, a goal to which both countries aspire, the US economic clout would be significantly diluted.

Turning to the European scene, other organizations have sprung up since World War II. Military alliances and security treaties provide the teeth of hegemonic competition, but they are only effective within the context of economic and political agreements. All of these will be addressed in proper sequence. First, a brief description of the key organizations.

A. REGIONAL STRUCTURES IN EUROPE

Five key organizations evolved over the next four decades: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and more recently the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). A sixth alignment, the European Stability Pact, has been proposed. They will be introduced in that order. The first three are western European structures and their full memberships are illustrated in Figure-1 -- all are members of the OSCE. OSCE and NACC memberships are given in the glossary.

FIGURE 1
WESTERN EUROPEAN REGIONAL STRUCTURES

COUNTRY	NATO MEMBER	WEU MEMBER	EU/EC MEMBER	UN SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT MEMBER
Austria		Observer	Yes	
Belgium	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Britain	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canada *	Yes			
Denmark	Yes	Observer	Yes	
Finland		Observer	Yes	
France	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Germany	Yes	Yes	Yes	Aspiring member
Greece	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Iceland *	Yes	Associate		
Ireland			Yes	
Italy	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Luxembourg	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Netherlands	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Norway	Yes	Associate	**	
Portugal	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Spain	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Sweden		Observer	Yes	
Switzerland				
Turkey	Yes	Associate		
US *	Yes			Yes

* Not European but shown because of NATO membership.

** Approved for 1 January 1995 membership in EU, but in a
28 November 1994 referendum Norway rejected membership.

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

On 4 April 1949 NATO was established by a treaty signed in Washington, D.C. The original twelve member nations were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United States. Greece and Turkey joined during February 1952 and West Germany (now a united Germany) in May 1955. Spain, the newest member, joined NATO in 1982, bringing the total member states to sixteen, as shown in Figure 1. NATO headquarters was first set up in Paris and later moved to Brussels.

NATO immediately led to a Military Defense Assistance Program (arms sales). It also led to the creation of a weapons industry in Europe..

The paramount decision-making body of NATO is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), made up of the foreign ministers from all member nations. NATO's military arm is the Allied Command of Europe. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe is always an American army general who is also commander-in-chief of US forces in Europe. "Collective Defense," as established by Article 5

of the North Atlantic Treaty, means that an attack on any NATO member is considered an attack on all. To this day that remains NATO's #1 mission. Collective defense has for four decades been a combination of forward-based conventional weapons and nuclear deterrence. From 1954 until 1967 the nuclear deterrence doctrine was "massive retaliation" to a massive attack on Europe. In 1967 that doctrine switched to a more gradually escalating "flexible response" policy.

In 1991, with the demise of the cold war, NATO abandoned forward deployment in favor of fewer but more flexible and more mobile rapid reaction forces accompanied by credible backup. These multinational forces are trained to respond globally to protect oil and other interests. In this regard, "peacekeeping" was added to NATO's activities in 1993, and became the #2 mission.

In an effort to strengthen NATO by enlarging its influence, and still not extending the Article 5 obligation of collective defense, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was approved at NATO's January 1994 summit. As of 10 February 1995, 24 eastern European countries, including most of the former Soviet republics, have shown interest in PfP. Fourteen have signed onto the affiliation. The incentive for moving closer to NATO is for PfP countries to buy huge quantities of western armaments to modernize their military, all under the guise of promoting better interoperability with NATO. PfP affiliation offers no security guarantees or economic help, but neither are human rights and democratic standards a prerequisite. PfP started as mainly a military partnership allowing participation in joint training exercises and peacekeeping missions. But on 8 November 1994 NATO enlarged PfP participation to some 27 technical areas -- an eventuality eagerly awaited by eastern European countries. Some 15 multinational military exercises involving PfP members are planned for 1995.

The possibility of full NATO membership some time in the future is still held up as an enticement. Yet, strong objections from Russia has made the guarantee of security to new members the main obstacle to NATO expansion. While visiting Munich on 4-5 February 1995, US Defense Secretary William Perry made it clear that PfP membership does not automatically imply NATO membership. He said, "Many members of Partnership for Peace will never qualify for NATO membership."¹ It appears that only the four Visegrad countries -- Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic -- have any hope of full NATO membership, and even that has aroused the Russian angst.

Russia is wary of NATO's growth. This eastward expansion cuts into Russia's military market and boosts the influence of anti-western hardliners inside Russia. Although Russia earlier showed interest in PfP membership, efforts to accelerate closer NATO ties for Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic caused Russia on 1 December 1994 to refuse to sign PfP papers. See the Glossary for PfP membership.

NATO is to this day the United States' toehold in Europe. Most, if not all, of NATO's transition to operate out of the North Atlantic Treaty area has been inspired by the United States. But Washington's unilateral lifting of the Bosnian arms embargo (described below) has set the US squarely against its European allies for the first time in NATO's history.

2. Western European Union (WEU).

Also in 1948, the year of the Marshall Plan and a year ahead of NATO, the Brussels Pact was adopted as a self-help security arrangement for Europe. Its provisions for a common defense are

¹*Defense News*, 20 February 1995, p. 19.

even more automatic than NATO's. France, Britain, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were the original members. West Germany (now a united Germany) and Italy joined in 1955 when the alliance became known as the Western European Union (WEU). Spain and Portugal joined in the 1980s. Greece joined later. Iceland, Norway and Turkey are associate members while Austria, Denmark and Sweden are observers. These are all depicted in Figure 1. WEU headquarters is now in Brussels, Belgium. This underlying treaty for the WEU will expire in 1997 if not renewed.

The WEU is dominated by France and strengthened by strong ties with Germany. Since it is a mutual security organization, the WEU threatens the need for NATO -- and thus threatens the only medium of US influence over Europe. Britain, a founding member of the WEU, has until recently leaned more toward NATO and alliance with the US. This started shifting during the 1990s. The Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine was established in July 1993, through which Britain and France now monitor and coordinate their nuclear policies. In early 1995, although still adamantly opposing integration of its military forces with the European Union, Britain for the first time endorsed a pan-European defense through a stronger WEU.

In January 1994, at the NATO summit, heads of government endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) with the WEU. This would allow NATO members to operate out-of-area without changing the North Atlantic Treaty -- they could also place their military forces under WEU command. While this appears to give NATO an interest in WEU activities, it also provides more prestige for the WEU, and it could give the WEU access to NATO stockpiles and armaments.

In September 1994 French Defense Minister Francois Leotard met with his NATO counterparts -- the first of such participation since De Gaulle removed the French military from integration with NATO's military command structure. Some view Leotard's participation as a sign of France drawing closer to NATO, but the more skeptical say it is to add a French voice to NATO decisions regarding the PfP and CJTF programs. The US and most NATO allies want the CJTF to be both under the NAC political oversight but administered by the NATO military command. France disagrees with the rationale that NATO's military command is too unwieldy for CJTF operations, and wants just the NAC political oversight. This would allow the NAC to choose some other command structure to meet conditions, possibly the WEU.

Some western European allies and some US officials see France's interest in NATO as subversion from within so the WEU can assume a dominant role in Europe. Such an eventuality would promote French influence and erode US leadership. There is fear that NATO allies will eventually be divided into two factions with France, allied with Germany, controlling one and the United States, backed by Britain leading the other. This is especially true if French influence determines the industrial teaming for developing weapons.

3. *European Union (EU).*

An important unification instrument in western Europe is the European Union (EU). It evolved through several transitions.

In June 1952 the European Coal and Steel Community entered into force. France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands were the six founding members.

In 1958 the European Economic Community was ratified by the same six members. It comprised the European Investment Bank and the European Common Market.

Also in 1958 the European Atomic Energy Community entered into force, again with the same

six members. The Council of Ministers, the European Assembly, and the European Court of Justice were held in common with the European Economic Community.

In 1967 these three organizations merged to form the European Community (EC). The same six nations were members. Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986. Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined on 1 January 1995, after it was renamed the EU. Norway was also approved but a 28 November 1994 referendum in that country rejected EU membership. Figure 1 illustrates this membership.

The executive branch of the EC is the Council of Ministers; the legislature is the popularly-elected European Parliament; and the judicial arm is the Court of Justice. The ultimate goal is to establish free trade, a common currency, and a common security plan. In some ways this threatens US dominance in Europe, but in the economic sense it would help US corporations if the US is able to participate fully in a free-trade agreement.

A blueprint for European unity was drawn up during the EC summit meeting at Maastricht, Netherlands in December 1991. After rigorous elections, and in some cases reelections, the Maastricht Treaty was finally ratified in late 1993 and went into effect on 1 November 1993. The name then became the European Union (EU). A free market was adopted but a common currency was deferred until at least 1999. The treaty specifies that the WEU is its security arm, although a common security policy remains unresolved. The WEU has no formal link with the EU.

A 27 January 1995 release by the EU governing body recommended replacing the planning and operational responsibilities of NATO's Military Committee with a reinvigorated WEU. Approval of military intervention would then be authorized by a majority vote rather than by NATO's cumbersome efforts to reach unanimous agreement.

In this paper the name European Community (EC) will be used prior to approval of the Maastricht Treaty, and European Union (EU) after the treaty went into effect on 1 November 1993.

4. *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).*

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) came into being during the Cold War. The final act was signed in 1975. On 5 December 1994, at its summit conference in Budapest, Hungary, the name was changed to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It presently includes 54 nations (although one is suspended) including all members of NATO, EU, and WEU; other western and eastern European countries; and the 15 former Soviet republics. OSCE fosters association with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and is the best vehicle for seeking pan-European unity, rather than merely western-European unity. Decision making is by consensus and therefore painstaking. Once achieved, however, the decision is palatable for every member.

A German proposal makes the OSCE a regional security organization under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter which acknowledges a special responsibility for regional organizations to resolve conflicts in their area. That mandate, adopted 10 July 1992 at the Helsinki summit, gives the CSCE/OSCE authority under international law to mandate peacemaking. It contained the stipulation that belligerents be fully cooperative before the OSCE begins operations. It would also put the stamp of legitimacy on NATO peacekeeping actions formulated by the OSCE -- actual UN involvement would not be necessary. The participating nations in the OSCE would share peacekeeping costs equally.²

²BASIC Reports, 17 August 1992, pp. 1-3.

On 4-5 June 1992 NATO foreign ministers met in Oslo, Norway. Always ready to strengthen NATO's position, they offered the use of NATO forces for peacekeeping missions mandated by the CSCE/OSCE. This would add NATO as the military arm of OSCE. France went along with the offer, but made sure it provided that NATO would decide on a case-by-case basis about committing forces outside its territory. France could veto NATO participation at that time.

Two weeks later, at its June 19th meeting in Bonn, Germany, the WEU matched NATO's move. The ministers said the WEU could be involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks as well as "tasks of combat forces in crisis management." The WEU would act "on a case-by-case basis" at the request of international organizations such as the UN or the OSCE.³

To date the main tool of CSCE/OSCE has been to send negotiators into areas of conflict in an attempt to reach a peaceful settlement by direct contact with the belligerents. Besides the former Yugoslavia, CSCE/OSCE has been active in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldavia, and Estonia. Although NATO and the WEU are both vying for the security-arm position of the OSCE, one hopeful aspect is that the OSCE has not yet chosen its security means. It is still possible for it to adopt a non-military, or at least a not-exclusively-military, security policy.

5. *North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).*

NATO created the NACC in early 1991 to draw OSCE member countries closer to NATO. NATO members, particularly the US, are trying to enhance NACC prestige as the most desirable pan-European regional organization, and thereby undermine political support and commitment to the OSCE. Although newer, and not as publicly known, the NACC is increasingly infringing on OSCE functions.

Membership in the NACC consists of all NATO members, all PfP affiliates except Slovenia and Sweden, plus Armenia, Belarus and Tajikistan. (See Glossary)

6. *European Stability Pact (proposed).*

In response to NATO's Partnership for Peace and NACC programs, France countered with the "Proposed European Stability Pact" introduced by French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur at the June 1993 meeting of the EU heads of state. Outwardly to guard against another Bosnian-type civil war in Europe, an underlying goal is to restore credibility to the EU after its failure in the former Yugoslavia.

Promise of eventual EU membership is used to encourage former Warsaw Pact countries to join the Pact -- joining the Pact would be one of several things necessary for EU membership.

Like NATO's PfP program, Pact members could also be associate members of the WEU, receive assistance in military training, and participate in peacekeeping missions.

Unlike PfP, the EU could offer economic assistance to Pact members so long as they uphold human rights standards and respect national borders -- borders are inviolable under the proposed Pact. Should any country violate these standards, economic help could be terminated and cooperation ended. In this manner it is hoped to remove the economic basis for conflict in Europe.

The Pact was launched at its inaugural conference in Paris on 26-27 May 1994. Nine former Warsaw Pact countries presently enjoy this associate membership in the WEU -- Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.

³AW&ST, 29 June 1992, p. 26.

The inaugural conference also deemed that the Pact be entrusted to the OSCE "for evaluating and for monitoring, according to its procedures, the implementations of the agreements and arrangements as well as the commitments which comprise them, placing the follow-up activities and meetings within the substantive and organizational context of the OSCE."⁴

Placing this Pact under OSCE jurisdiction would be a great boost for pan-European unity. But the Pact could bode evil for NATO's programs which fall short of offering economic assistance.

B. THE KEY PLAYERS

The United States, France, Britain, and Germany are the key players in the struggle to control Europe. The first three are nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council. Germany aspires to permanent membership and has a potential for again becoming the strongest European power.

1. *United States: Struggling to Hold Its Influence.*

The shooting war was barely over before the Cold War began. Washington was in constant disagreement with Moscow. America departed from its century-old policy of avoiding "entangling alliances" and took steps to retain the influence it had established in Europe during World War II.

Retired General George C. Marshall on 5 June 1947 proposed the European Recovery Program in a speech at Harvard University. Later to be called the Marshall Plan, this program provided US economic help for reconstruction of European countries. It was authorized by the US Congress in December 1947, and went into effect the following year. It also gave the US an economic toehold in Europe. That toehold led to a beachhead through NATO.

NATO was formed to counter the military might of the Soviet Union. Since the USSR no longer exists, NATO, to survive, must restructure its forces and redefine its roles. This has proven difficult because a single member can block any proposal. France seems determined to relegate NATO to its original mission, which no longer exists, thus making NATO irrelevant and diminishing US influence.

US concerns are epitomized in the 1992 Senate testimony of retired General Edward C. Meyer, former Army Chief of Staff. He said integration of the European Community is being accelerated by three factors: (1) an October 1991 declaration of intent to form a Franco-German army corps under the aegis of the WEU, (2) the December 1991 Maastricht decision to move toward a common foreign and military policy, and (3) the intent of the EU to use the WEU as its military arm. Among the reasons he gave for keeping 75,000 US troops in Europe were (a) to maintain US military, political, and economic influence, (b) to prevent Germany from assuming a leadership role and possibly developing a nuclear force, and (c) to minimize competition in arms production and sales. Finally, with regard to the Franco-German Corps, General Meyer said the impact on US influence "is not threatening at the present time. The real challenge is what the French underlying rationale for their interest in this is. We are going to need a US presence through the end of the century to help shape French views."⁵

⁴Concluding Document on the Inaugural Conference for a Pact on Stability in Europe; cited in *BASIC/BITS REPORT 94.1*, p. 31.

⁵S.Hrg. 102-834, pp. 47-49.

In addition to concerns about France or Germany taking over the leadership of Europe, the US does not want any European agreements with Russia without US approval. Of course all these concerns center around the economic potential of Europe for American businesses. And the underlying theme for US participation focuses on NATO's survival and influence.

2. *France: Seeking a Greater Voice.*

Tensions came to a head in NATO during 1958. French President Charles de Gaulle, determined to reduce US control, claimed a special leadership role and began building his own nuclear force. Then in 1966, a dispute over NATO shifting its nuclear strategy from "massive retaliation" to the more gradually escalating "flexible response" doctrine caused France to withdraw its armed forces from NATO's integrated command structure. NATO forces were removed from French soil and NATO headquarters was moved to Brussels, Belgium. France did, however, retain participation in the political consultative mechanism.

In 1967 France started deploying its own independent nuclear force to continue the policy of "massive retaliation," and to this day France maintains unilateral control over that force. Nevertheless, despite France's aloof attitude toward participation in NATO, in recent years it has shown a strong commitment to aiding other western European nations if they are attacked.

For a single purpose, and only for the time being, France wants a US presence in Europe, through NATO, because only the US could stand up to a resurgent Russian threat. Once an all-European structure can assume that role, France is ready to step into the leadership position. France is the only major European power which is increasing its military spending.

3. *Britain: Still in the Running.*

Britain also has an independent nuclear force which is assigned to NATO with two reservations: only the British Prime Minister may authorize missile launches, and Britain retains the right to order their launch independently. These restrictions make assignment to NATO a cosmetic gesture. That nuclear force is now being modernized and, while the US and Russia are reducing nuclear warheads, Britain is increasing the number of targets it can destroy.

4. *Germany: New and Greater.*

In late 1950 it became clear that West Germany must have some function in NATO. The NATO policy of forward defense along communist borders required German participation. In August 1954 West Germany was invited to join NATO. Thus German rearmament began.

Since reunification, Germany has been increasingly flexing its muscles. Chancellor Helmut Kohl has repeatedly urged loosening constitutional barriers to sending German troops outside the NATO area. The United States and NATO have also been pressing Germany to loosen its restrictions on use of German troops. The United States, in particular, would like to see greater German contributions to NATO missions. This would strengthen NATO, and US influence in Europe through NATO. France, on the other hand, is orchestrating greater German participation in what France hopes will someday be a Euro-Army.

Kohl wants greater participation by Germany which is commensurate with its size and economic strength. On 23 September 1992, the day after Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe made a similar bid, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel told the UN General Assembly

that Germany would like to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Kinkel promised that Germany would rewrite its constitution to allow German soldiers to participate in UN operations.

So there we have the standoff. On the one hand US-dominated NATO with a new force structure set to intervene in peacemaking and peacekeeping operations under the OSCE or UN sticker. On the other hand France, still keeping its military aloof from NATO, is building the WEU as a step toward an all-European army which excludes the US, but also placing WEU services at the call of the OSCE or UN. Germany and Britain exert their influence at every opportunity. All are elbowing for position.

C. TOWARD AN ALL-EUROPEAN ARMY

NATO and the WEU have been the US and French instruments vying for the security agency of a united Europe.

1. *NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps.*

When the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union dissolved, NATO had to find a new reason for existence. So in April 1991 NATO's Military Committee approved a three-tiered defense structure to meet changed conditions -- each tier in a decreasing state of readiness. On highest alert is the Rapid Reaction Corps, comprising up to 100,000 troops under British command and ready to move quickly to trouble areas -- even outside the NATO area.

Second down on the readiness scale are the Main Defense Forces which comprise the bulk of NATO forces -- five or six divisions of international mix, including Germany. At the lowest state of readiness are the Augmentation Forces, mainly composed of US reserve units.

NATO's governing body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), approved the Rapid Reaction Corps in June 1991, and it is to become fully operational in 1995. In November 1991 the NAC approved the full NATO force structure.

2. *WEU's Euro-Corps.*

France was quick to respond to NATO's reorganization. On 16 October 1991 it made a joint announcement with Germany proposing an all-European military force outside of NATO. The force would perhaps be 50,000 troops -- Army Corps-size -- and provide the backbone of a European-only military capability; the nucleus of a Euro-Army. The two countries called on the European Community to entrust European security to the WEU, but they made it clear that a Franco-German force would emerge anyway. A 5,000-troop Franco-German brigade had already been established in 1989.

US President George Bush counterattacked during the November 1991 NATO summit in Rome. In a remark aimed at France he said, "Our premise is that the American role in the defense and affairs of Europe will not be made superfluous by European union. If our premise is wrong -- if, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defense -- the time to tell us is today."⁶

⁶*SJMN*, 8 November 1991, p. 22A.

During its summit at Maastricht, Netherlands the following month, the EC anointed the WEU as its security apparatus, but composed diplomatic language in describing its function. While saying the EC plans to channel its military activities through the WEU as its consultative organ, it also specified that WEU actions must be compatible with NATO. Since all full members of the WEU belong to both NATO and EC, this makes the WEU a bridge between the two organizations in the short run. (See Figure 1) But over the longer haul, structure is in place for an all-European defense. As the WEU enlists more members common to the EU and NATO -- all full WEU members must have a common membership with the EU -- a caucus forms within NATO which President Bush warned could isolate the US and Canada as non-European nations and threaten the viability of NATO.⁷

To enhance the WEU along these lines, Greece (a member of both EU and NATO) was invited to become a member. Turkey and Iceland (both NATO members but not EU) have become WEU associate members, as has Norway (a NATO member which will join the EU in January 1995). Associate members can take part in WEU discussions and participate in military exercises, but do not have veto power on issues. Denmark (both NATO and EU member) and Ireland (an EU member) have been given WEU observer status. This further strengthens the WEU at the expense of NATO.

France and Germany on 22 May 1992 announced the establishment of a Euro-Army headquarters in Strasbourg, France, and the formation of a 42,000-man Franco-German army corps -- a Euro-Corps. It is an armored corps scheduled to be operational in 1995. Belgium is making a smaller contribution comprising most of its army units. Spain has said it will contribute troops and Poland has been invited as an observer.

The Euro-Corps so far consists of 40,000 troops -- the Franco-German brigade, one French division, one German division, a Belgium division, and a Spanish brigade. German General Helmut Willmann is the commanding officer.

According to the treaty signed in La Rochelle on May 22nd, the main missions are to be the defense of Europe, peacekeeping/peacemaking, and humanitarian actions. The corps is really just a command structure because troops committed to it remain under the control of their own countries during peacetime. Troops are only transferred to the corps at the discretion of their own government.

While inviting other European countries to enlist their forces, France and Germany reduced opposition from some quarters by assuring NATO that the Euro-Corps will not be competitive. That will be true while it is still at corps strength.

3. *Other French or German Multinational Military Units.*

A Franco-German naval squadron was reactivated at Wilhelmshaven, Germany on 25 October 1993. It is under German command.

A Dutch-German army corps, which will include at least one division from each country, will become operational in 1995.

France, Spain and Italy grouped together in November 1992 to create a new multinational air and naval force to handle regional security issues in the Mediterranean. It will compliment the Franco-German Corps. On the surface these three nations promise full cooperation with NATO, but the existence of such a regional security force definitely complicates NATO's influence in the

⁷*International Herald Tribune*, 11 December 1991.

Mediterranean. Formation of this force is a top priority of the WEU military planning group, which also coordinates the Franco-German Corps. This aeromarine force also tops the agenda for the 16 December 1994 Franco-Italian summit.

In July 1993 Britain and France created a joint Anglo-French nuclear planning committee to coordinate their nuclear defense policies.

France and Britain announced on 18 November 1994 that they have agreed to a joint air group based at High Wycombe, England. It will initially be commanded by a French general which will periodically alternate with a British general. At present the command is merely a small staff with no permanent military units. But it will be able to draw on the air forces of both countries when the need arises. British Prime Minister John Major described the goal of this air group as planning and coordinating joint training and operations in order to "set up more speedily combined operations in pursuit of our joint interests, such as humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, and peacemaking missions."⁸

At the WEU's 9 May 1994 meeting, Italy proposed that it establish a multinational ground force under the WEU banner. At NATO's defense ministers meeting in Seville on 29-30 September 1994, Spain suggested that these same three countries establish a joint naval force.⁹

4. *Kohl's Leaner and Meaner Military.*

During February 1993, under heavy pressure to make huge federal budget cuts, Kohl announced that he would cut Germany's armed forces -- Europe's largest -- from 560,000 to 345,000. But he said the new German military would be "a flexible, mobile force designed to help manage political crises."¹⁰

A military white paper released 5 April 1994 identified some key capabilities of the German armed forces. They include strategic reconnaissance, command and control; sea and air mobility to deploy and support force over long distances; general logistic support and communications capability; and an effective missile defense.

The general German Army breakdown will enhance mobility and quick response. This will be accomplished through a new airborne brigade comprising three combat helicopter regiments and an airborne infantry battalion. Support units will be reinforced by establishing three logistic brigades, three medical brigades, eight combat engineer brigades, one electronic intelligence and electronic warfare brigade, and four command and control brigades.

Other army units will be 19 mechanized brigades, four light brigades, and the Franco-German brigade. The air force will be made up of four fighter wings, six attack and reconnaissance wings, six air-defense missile wings, two radar regiments, and transportation and training units. The Navy will comprise one naval air wing, a frigate squadron, a destroyer squadron, a fast-attack boat squadron, a submarine squadron, and a reinforced minehunter squadron.

5. *Other European Multinational Military Units.*

Belgium and the Netherlands formalized an agreement on 28 March 1995 which merges their Navies' operational staffs at a single center in Den Helder on the Dutch coast. Integrated naval

⁸Cited in *Defense News*, 21 November 1994, p. 28.

⁹*BASIC Reports*, 4 October 1994, p. 2.

¹⁰*SJMN*, 7 February 1993, p. 20A.

training and maintenance will now take place. The next step being pursued will merge the two countries' Air Forces.

D. POWER BRINKMANSHIP IN THE BALKANS

A Balkan News editorial charged that Yugoslavia "broke down because Western Europe, with Germany at the fore-front, decided not to support it any more. The European Union opted instead for the secession drive of the Yugoslav federative states. The Slovenian, the Croatian, and the Bosnian wars were the result of the premature break-down of Yugoslavia, performed without solving major issues, among which territorial disputes and minority rights are the core of the problem."¹¹

1. *Germany's Contribution Toward Unrest.*

No nation contributed more toward premature secession from Yugoslavia than Germany, not only by its own quick recognition of independent states but also by its leverage in getting the European Union to do the same. British Parliamentarian Gerald Kaufman calls the 11 December 1991 Maastricht summit meeting "the nodal moment from which all else has followed inexorably" in the former Yugoslavia.¹² At that meeting Britain was adamant that it should be exempt from the EC's common currency. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, a chief architect of European unity, then used his leverage to provide that exemption in the treaty -- thus allowing British Prime Minister John Major to return home claiming a diplomatic victory. The payoff came five days later at an EC foreign ministers meeting. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd "agreed to the demands of the then German Foreign Minister [Hans Deitrich] Genscher that all EC countries should recognize the former Yugoslav republics which declared their independence ..."¹³ The rest is history. Germany recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia on 23 December 1991. The EC followed suit on 15 January 1992.

Germany has since been criticized for its role in aggravating the wars in former Yugoslavia, and for its growing power. In response, Kohl said in January 1992 that, "If you always want to be popular, then you can neither shape things nor accomplish things, and in the end, you're even more alone."¹⁴

2. *Competition as Rhetoric Escalates.*

The hegemonic struggle between America and France focuses on NATO and the WEU, and their ability to achieve the legitimizing banner of the UN or OSCE. If NATO could straighten out the Yugoslavia turmoil, it would show that the US is still needed in Europe. But if the WEU could solve that problem it would assert France's leadership role in Europe and show that NATO is now superfluous. The temptations are great and both entities have teetered on the edge of the Yugoslav quagmire.

¹¹*Balkan News*, 17 April 1994., p. 2.

¹²Kaufman.

¹³Kaufman.

¹⁴*SJMN*, 11 January 1992, p. 6A.

Events happened fast in June 1992. By mid-month over a dozen cease fires had been broken in Bosnia. Sarajevo was under siege, relief convoys were halted, and flights into the airport were attacked. Artillery, mortar and tank fire was killing men, women and children alike. Atrocities were mounting on all sides. On June 18th United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, believing the UN should do more than policing, suggested a UN all-volunteer highly-trained rapid-deployment peace-enforcement unit. "The ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring breaches of the peace," said Boutros-Ghali.¹⁵

Up to this point the Bush administration agreed to participate in a multi-national coalition to enforce a cease fire. It would provide air cover for relief convoys and military air-lift planes, but opposed using US ground troops. Bush expected that the airlift would be 95 percent American but no operations would take place until after a cease fire was in place.

When the UN peacekeeping force gave up trying to keep Sarajevo airport open, the White House dropped the cease-fire prerequisite and indicated it would join a multinational operation to blaze a safe path into Bosnia for humanitarian aid.

On June 23rd, then State Secretary James Baker broke diplomatic relations with the Belgrade government. Asked about military intervention, Baker said, "We have not ruled out -- we have not ruled in -- participation in some multilateral action."¹⁶

Meanwhile, NATO commanders were increasing military preparedness should the UN Security Council order an airlift. Although this was ostensibly a humanitarian operation, NATO officials recognized a need for some military action to silence artillery and mortar fire from the hillsides. NATO reconnaissance planes were already making UN-approved spy flights over Bosnia.

Moscow objected to operations under the NATO flag. Besides excluding Russia, such action lacked the moral weight of a broader-based UN or OSCE initiative -- Russia belongs to both.

UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali on June 26th gave Serbia 48 hours to halt its military offensive or face the consequences. The consequences, Boutros-Ghali hinted, were that the UN Security Council would be forced to decide on "other means" to deliver humanitarian aid. The Serbs immediately stopped firing on the Bosnian capital, for a few hours.

The EC was not passive all this time. On June 26th, during its foreign ministers and defense officials meeting in London, a series of military operations was investigated to support "peacemaking" and not just "peacekeeping." There was growing support in many EC governments for military action by the WEU. French President Francois Mitterrand said "events in Yugoslavia have us by the throat," and he called for "hard action." Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis said Italy was prepared to dispatch troops as part of a WEU operation to deliver aid. The Dutch government would take part in such an operation if it were sanctioned by the UN.¹⁷

The next day, June 27th -- at its summit meeting in Lisbon, Portugal -- the EC made its first formal commitment to use military force, if necessary, to get humanitarian aid to Sarajevo. They announced an immediate commitment of aircraft, troops, and supplies under UN authority if there was no cease fire within the UN's 48-hour deadline. The EC pointed out that repeated appeals for help from the Bosnian government did not have to wait for another UN Security Council resolution to be answered.

¹⁵*SJMN*, 19 June 1992, p. 14A.

¹⁶*International Herald Tribune*, 24 June 1992, p. 2.

¹⁷*The Guardian*, 27 June 1992, p. 1.

3. *France Grabs the Ball and Runs.*

In a shrewd move apparently calculated to trump Bush's hand, French President Mitterrand flew directly from the Lisbon summit to Bosnia on 27 June 1992. He was not able to land at the Sarajevo airport but set down in Split, about 150 miles away in Croatia. The next day, Sunday, he traveled by land to Sarajevo where he vowed to reopen the airport. The Serbs did relinquish control to UN forces and on June 29th two French transports on Monday flew in with 13 tons of food and medicine. By July 1st, four French flights had arrived without waiting for the airport to be fully secured. Mitterrand said force would be used if needed to keep the airport operating.

America immediately jumped into the fray. Washington offered to put Air Force and Navy combat air cover over Sarajevo to protect relief missions when asked by the UN. The Pentagon placed 2,200 marines aboard ships just off the Yugoslav coast. State Secretary Baker said, "We have substantial airlift capabilities already available in Europe that the president has made very clear will be committed to this effort and we have supplies, rations and medical supplies on the ground in Zagreb (capital of Croatia) waiting to go." Baker continued, "The UN has wanted to establish security at the airport before flights commence. Let me disabuse you of the impression that somehow there's any reluctance on the part of the United States. There is none."¹⁸ With Mitterrand stealing the show, Bush was chomping at the bit.

Although the French had flown in 30 tons of relief supplies by Tuesday, June 30th, only half had been distributed before the airport again came under fire. The next day France flew in 125 marines to help the 80 UN (Canadian) troops secure the airport. 850 blue-helmeted Canadian troops were having difficulty crossing disputed territory to arrive at the airport by land. 350 arrived July 2nd from the 180-mile overland trip through mountainous areas from the coast. The balance on Friday, July 3rd.

4. *The US Sprints to Catch Up.*

The US began its airlift early July 2nd from Rhine-Maine Air Base near Frankfurt, Germany. C-130s carried forklifts and military rations. The EC announced the start of a ten-plane airlift and a Norwegian military plane brought in medical supplies. Conditions were still tenuous, however. UN observers accused all sides of violating the cease fire. By July 5th the Bush administration's stance of US ground combat troops changed from "absolutely not" to "possible but unlikely."

Ten days after the first plane landed in Sarajevo, 80 flights of "Operation Provide Promise" had delivered about 990 tons of food and medical supplies. There were now 15-17 flights a day from Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway and the US. About 20 other nations expressed interest in joining the airlift. The 380,000 Sarajevans need about 190 tons of food daily. Three weeks of airlifting resulted in 280 flights bringing in 3,346 metric tons of supplies.

5. *More Competition at Sea.*

On 10 July 1992 the WEU dispatched six ships under Italian command, supported by airplanes and helicopters, to the Adriatic Sea to monitor compliance with UN sanctions. The next day the US and NATO responded by sending a multinational force of eight frigates and destroyers supported by air reconnaissance to enforce the embargo. One of the NATO vessels was the German destroyer

¹⁸International Herald Tribune, 1 July 1992, p. 1.

Bayern. NATO and WEU forces are under separate command but they are ostensibly coordinating closely. French ships are part of the WEU force and US ships are part of the NATO group. Within a few weeks, however, all ships were placed under a joint command.

When France announced later in 1992 that it was prepared to send 1,100 troops to Bosnia to assist in relief operations, presumably as part of the WEU, the US made another move. The US aircraft carrier Saratoga arrived in the Adriatic Sea and NATO ministers began reviewing contingency operations. But, fearing a recurrence of the Vietnam quagmire, NATO rejected a plan calling for 100,000 troops to open a land corridor, and ordered its military planners to come up with an option using fewer troops. At the same time Pentagon officials were telling the US Congress it would take 400,000 troops to impose at best a fragile peace. "While we could certainly suppress the level of fighting among the combatants," one senior Defense Department official testified, "our own forces could become the objects of guerrilla war that could have no end."¹⁹

6. *Controversy Over Air Strikes.*

In early August 1992 Bush began bargaining for a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force in the Balkans. Resolution No. 770 was passed on 13 August 1992 by a 12-0 majority -- China, India and Zimbabwe abstaining. It calls for "all measures necessary" to protect relief shipments but leaves the implementation plan to individual nations (like the US or France) and regional organizations (like NATO and the WEU).

Britain and France had the most troops for the UN Protective Forces around Sarajevo. Britain, reluctant about intervening after decades of fighting in Northern Ireland, said the resolution only authorized force as a last resort. France, citing that its unprotected troops at Sarajevo would be slaughtered by Serbian backlash to air strikes, opposed such strikes by NATO.

It was not until over a year later, when Russia exerted diplomatic leverage and peacekeeping participation in Bosnia, that France approved of air strikes by NATO. Nevertheless, France continued to exert influence to keep NATO in check. NATO's Military Committee on 5 August 1993 approved MC 327 entitled "NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations" which would allow NATO to send troops out of the NATO area. France, which is not part of the Military Committee since it pulled its troops out of integration with NATO, blocked political approval of MC 327 at the higher foreign minister level. Nevertheless, NATO military planners still use MC 327 as their guideline.

7. *Germany Tests Its Limits.*

A great uproar was created in Germany when in July 1992 Chancellor Helmut Kohl sent a destroyer and three reconnaissance planes to help NATO enforce the UN embargo of Yugoslavia. This was Germany's first military excursion outside of NATO area since the end of World War II.

In December 1992 Kohl announced plans to send German peacekeeping troops to Somalia when the fighting ceases. He believed he could finesse domestic opposition as long as the troops were under UN command. 1,600 German troops were sent but only in safe areas. After the US pulled out there were no safe places, so the Germans also had to leave.

In April 1993, NATO began flights to monitor the "No Fly Zone" over Bosnia. German fliers made up about a third of the crews for NATO's AWACS reconnaissance planes. Kohl's three-party

¹⁹AW&ST, 17 August 1992, p. 19.

ruling coalition became sharply divided over whether German personnel should be put in such near-combat situations and the decision was passed to Germany's highest court.

Some 20 cabinet members and leading industrialists testified before the court that Kohl's coalition government could fracture and Germany would find itself isolated in NATO if the eight-judge court didn't provide a legal path for German crews to take part in AWACS reconnaissance missions over Bosnia. Manfred Woerner, then NATO Secretary General, testified that NATO would have difficulty conducting such flights without the German crews.

Kohl received a much-needed boost on April 8th when the Federal Constitutional Court, in a 5-3 decision, issued a strongly-worded decision warning that continuing Germany's self-imposed restrictions on its military role would "endanger the trust for Germany within the (NATO) alliance."²⁰

The court's ruling made little reference to constitutional elements but instead relied mainly on the political damage which would be suffered if Germany did not participate. The court did, however, limit its ruling to the AWACS question, promising a broader ruling on the constitutional question in several months.

Several months stretched into over a year. It was not until 12 July 1994 that the high court handed Kohl a decisive victory. The court noted that: "Peace forces and their task of securing peace are part of the United Nations' system of collective security as it has developed through the practical application of the UN charter, which the Federal Republic of Germany joined in 1993. Then the court ruled: "For that reason, German soldiers also may be deployed in the framework of United Nations peace troops even when they have a mandate to use force."²¹

The high court did say that Kohl had infringed on the rights of parliament because he did not consult with lawmakers before deploying troops abroad, and that future deployments must be approved by a simple majority of parliament. Parliament, in a special session convened on 22 July 1994, approved participation of German troops for air and sea patrols in the former Yugoslavia, thus legitimizing the current deployment of German forces abroad.

Germany's ability to send its military forces on international missions boosts Kohl's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

8. *US Unilateral Action Strains NATO Alliance.*

After the prolonged failure in getting all sides to agree to a Bosnian peace plan, and after continued Serbian defiance of NATO's threat to use air strikes, the US took unilateral action to disengage itself from the Balkan dilemma. On 15 November 1994 President Clinton announced that the US would no longer enforce the UN-mandated arms embargo against Bosnia, and that the US will no longer share related intelligence information. Congress had voted the previous summer that on November 15th all funds for enforcing the embargo would be cut off. Although this did not have a significant effect on monitoring sea-traffic -- only three US ships were involved -- it did create a crisis in the NATO alliance. A US general is the supreme allied commander of NATO forces as well as commander-in-chief of US forces in Europe. How he was to fulfill the conflicting policies was a big question mark. More important, however, NATO allies were abraded because this unilateral action illustrates that America will pull out of coalition agreements when US interests are no longer

²¹*SJMN*, 13 July 1994, p. 21A.

satisfied. Because NATO is strongly influenced by the US, this event has severely damaged NATO's prestige in Europe.

E. CONCLUSION

The power play in Europe is subtle but intense. The US is struggling to hold its influence. France wants a broader leadership role. Many European countries want to eventually squeeze the US out of the picture while others cling to America's technological coattail. A dramatic struggle is shaping up for political control. And, as in so many other situations, economics may have the final say. The second part of this paper will address that aspect.

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GLOSSARY

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile.
AWACS	Airborne Warning And Control System.
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force -- a NATO concept that would allow NATO forces to operate out-of-area.
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe -- now renamed Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
EC	European Community, now the European Union (EU).
EU	European Union. Formerly European Community. 15 members -- Austria, Belgium, Britain, Finland, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Norway rejected membership in a 28-November-1994 referendum.
NAC	North Atlantic Council, NATO's governing body.
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council (39 members) The member nations are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland (observer), France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldavia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Tadjikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United States, Uzbekistan.
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (16 members -- Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United States).
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization.
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe -- formerly CSCE. It is composed of 53 members and one suspended, including all members of NATO, NACC, WEU, EU, and PfP, as well as all former Soviet republics. The member nations are Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (observer), Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tadjikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United States, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia (suspended).
PfP	Partnership for Peace with NATO. As of 16-May-1995, 24 eastern European countries and former Soviet republics have shown interest in this status: Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldavia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The 14 underlined have already signed onto PfP.
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union (10 members -- France, Britain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal). Associate members are Iceland, Norway and Turkey. Observers are Austria, Denmark Finland, and Sweden.

APPENDIX-A: US MILITARY UNITS

The following breakdown of military units is for US forces. It is assumed that other nations have a comparable structure and this breakdown should provide a grasp of military administrative and tactical organization.

US Army Structure.

Army:	Two or more Corps plus auxiliary troops.
Corps:	Normally composed of two or more divisions plus some service troops.
Division:	Two or more brigades plus necessary attached battalions.
Brigade:	Two or more battalions with service and administrative units.
Battalion:	Three or more companies or batteries.
Company:	The lowest administrative unit of the army. Two or more platoons and a headquarters. (The basic unit of artillery is called a battery, and is equivalent to a company.)
Platoon:	Two or more squads.
Squad:	The smallest tactical unit, usually a few soldiers, or troops.

US Navy Structure.

Fleet:	Numerous warships under one command, usually in a specific theater of operations.
Group:	Two or more squadrons.
Squadron:	Several warships.

US Air Force Structure.

Division:	Two or more wings.
Wing:	Several groups.
Group:	Two or more squadrons.
Squadron:	Two or more flights.
Flight:	Several aircraft. The smallest tactical unit of the Air Force.