

UNDERSTANDING THE “WAR ON TERRORISM”: REGIME CHANGE IN IRAN¹

Compiled by Bob Aldridge

*This notion that the US is getting ready to attack Iran
is simply ridiculous.*

Having said that, all options are on the table.

— George W. Bush (February 2005 in Brussels)

PRELUDE

Condoleezza Rice made her first journey abroad as Secretary of State in early 2005. On February 3rd, a reporter aboard the flight to London asked: “Is it the intention of this administration to come out with a more robust policy, and to be firmer with the Iranians? And will it support active regime change?”

After digressing into Iran’s behavior regarding terrorism and nuclear ambitions, Rice said “the policy is to make very clear to the Iranians that those behaviors are not acceptable and to work with others to try to deal with them.” Then she added: “Now, in terms of the Iranian regime, I don’t think anybody thinks that the unelected Mullahs who run the regime are a good thing, for either the Iranian people or the region. ... I think our European allies agree that the Iranian regime’s human rights behavior, and its behavior toward its own population, is something to be loathed.”

Unsatisfied, the reporter riposted: “That doesn’t answer my question. My question was, is the US interested in regime change?”

Rice again waffled: “Robin, we are engaged in a process with many others that is aimed at making clear to the Iranians that their behavior, internally and externally, is out of step with the directions and desires of the international community.”

¹This paper is part of a series on understanding why we are fighting terrorism. There is nothing new in it that hasn’t been published elsewhere, and of course the coverage is not comprehensive. The purpose of this paper is to compile some pertinent information together so that a pattern can be seen. BA

Several other reporters then got Rice's attention with their own questions. But soon the intrepid Robin got in again with an even more direct question: "Are you going to answer my question? Do you support regime change in Iran?"

Rice again ducked the issue: "Robin, what we support is that the Iranian people should have a chance to determine their own future, and right now under this regime they have no opportunity to determine their own future."

During a press conference the next day in London, the persistent Robin again raised an unwelcome voice: "On the plane we asked you repeatedly about regime change. Can you say 'yes' or 'no?' Has the policy changed? Does the Bush administration support regime change in Iran?"

Having had the night to polish up her answer, Rice gave a long reply: "Well, first of all, let me state very clearly what we hope to achieve concerning the Iranian regime." [Rice then lists purported US-European unity on opposing Iran's support for terrorism, alleged nuclear weapons program, undermining the election in Iraq, and Iran's human rights abuses.] Finally she said: "We have many diplomatic tools still at our disposal and we intend to pursue them fully."

Another reporter followed up: "Secretary of State, can I ask you to clarify that last answer. Can you envisage circumstances during President Bush's second administration in which the United States would attack Iran?"

Rice responded: "The question is simply not on the agenda *at this point in time*. ... But we believe, particularly in regard to the nuclear issue, that while no one ever asks the America President to take all his options ... any option off the table, that there are plenty of diplomatic means at our disposal to get the Iranians to finally live up to their international obligations." [I have italicized "at this point in time."]

Then another reporter asked: "Vice President Cheney said recently that the diplomatic efforts on Iran might be forestalled by an Israeli decision to attack Iran's nuclear plant. I wonder if the [British] Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State will do anything to encourage or discourage the Israeli government in that direction?"

Rice quickly gave a non-response: "First let me not respond to what was necessarily a paraphrase of what the Vice President said, but the point is that the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon is deeply destabilizing." She went on to discuss the IAEA process and efforts by Britain, France and Germany, **but she completely defused and purposely deflected an answer to that question.**²

This evasiveness is worrisome. It is now almost a year later and diplomatic approaches are floundering. What is the White House thinking today?

- - - - -

²All quotations in Prelude are from the State Department web site, 4 February 2005. See *Washington File*.

CONTENTS

PRELUDE - - - - 1

CONTENTS - - - - 3

A LITTLE BACKGROUND ON IRAN - - - - 4

Iran's Terrorist Activities - - - - 4

Iran's Secret Nuclear Program - - - - 5

Geopolitics of Oil and Gas - - - - 6

DOES IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM VIOLATE THE NPT - - - - 8

The NPT and the IAEA - - - - 8

Producing Weapons Grade Plutonium From Light Water Reactors - - - - 9

Producing Weapons Grade Plutonium From Heavy Water Reactors - - - - 11

Using Centrifuges to Enrich Uranium to Weapons Grade - - - - 12

Kalaye Electric Company - - - - 12

Natanz Pilot Enrichment Plant - - - - 13

THE PROS AND CONS - - - - 14

Iran's Position - - - - 14

The US and EU Position - - - - 15

DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT - - - - 15

Iran's Voluntary and Temporary Agreement - - - - 15

More secret Programs Discovered - - - - 16

ALL STICK AND NO CARROTS - - - - 18

Framework Agreement proposed by the EU-3 - - - - 19

Iran Ends Its Voluntary Moratorium on Nuclear Production - - - - 20

PREPARING FOR REGIME CHANGE IN IRAN - - - - 22

Redeployment of Troops - - - - 24

Predators Over Iran - - - - 25

Ian Warns of Retaliation - - - - 26

Adding Israel to the Regime Change Equation - - - - 28

Will Regime Change be a Joint Operation - - - - 30

IS THERE A SOLUTION? - - - - 30

REFERENCES - - - - 33

GLOSSARY - - - - 37

APPENDIX-A: MAP OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR SITES - - - - 38

APPENDIX-B: US MILITARY BASES SURROUNDING IRAN - - - - 39

A LITTLE BACKGROUND ON IRAN

I want to address three concerns regarding Iran. They are Iran's support for terrorism, Iran's secret nuclear program, and Iran's oil and gas potential. They all play an important part in motivating regime change in Iran. The first and second are used to justify regime change. The third is the true but unspoken motivation for preemptive force.

Iran's Terrorist Activities.

Iran has been accused of supporting HizbAllah³ and Hamas⁴ – organizations operating in Lebanon and Israel which the US has put on the list of terrorist organizations. Iran and Syria do not classify them as such. Iran and many Arab countries consider the establishment of Israel, and the displacement of the Palestinians from their own country, as an invasion of the Arab/Muslim world. Therefore, most Muslim countries do not recognize the legitimacy of Israel and consider themselves to be in a state of war with the Zionist nation. In their opinion HizbAllah and Hamas are engaged in traditional warfare.

HizbAllah (Party of God) is the name of a Shiite organization sponsored and controlled by Iran. It started off as regional terrorist groups such as the Lebanese HizbAllah and the Persian Gulf HizbAllah. It was these groups that formed a coalition with the Sunni Islamists (then based in Sudan) to plan the deadly Mogadishu ambush of 5 June 1993 – *Blackhawk Down* – that caused the US to withdraw from Somalia. That alliance of convenience between Shiite and Sunni Muslim extremists continued until early 1996 when it emerged as the HizbAllah International. HizbAllah International has been described by one US official as “the most profound change in Iranian intelligence since Khomeini's Islamic Revolution,” and a “new direction in state-sponsored international terrorism.”⁵

Regarding Iran's connection with 9/11, President Bush stated in July 2004 that the US will continue to look into whether Iran was involved: “As to direct connections with Sept. 11, we're digging into the facts to determine if there was one.”⁶ The 9/11 Commission did identify some ancillary connections. Its final report states that “as many as 10 of the Sept. 11 hijackers traveled through Iran in late 2000 and early 2001 ...”⁷ Iran had reportedly ordered its border guard not to stamp their passports as they passed through the country while going to and from training in Afghanistan. Because of US sanctions on Iran, a stamp in their

³HizbAllah means Party of God -- there are many spellings used of which Hezbollah and Hizballah are common.

⁴Hamas is an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, which translates to Islamic Resistance Movement.

⁵See Bodansky, page 153.

⁶Entous, 19 July 2004.

⁷Shenon, 18 July 2004.

passports would have triggered additional scrutiny. Iran admitted that some hijackers may have passed through but claims it has now tightened its border security.

This brief description will have to suffice in this paper for illustrating Iran's role as a state sponsor of international terrorism.⁸ All of this terrorist activity is not being lost on US foreign policy planners. They have not only placed Iran on the list of seven states that sponsor global terrorism, but President Bush has also dubbed that country as one of the tripartite "axis of evil." Of that threesome there are now only two left – North Korea and Iran.

Iran's Secret Nuclear Program.

Under Auspices of the US, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center was built between 1960-65 and supplied with a US-furnished, 5-megawatt research reactor. Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 as a non-nuclear country, and ratified it in 1970. Also in 1970, Shah Reza Pahlavi started a civilian nuclear energy program to construct, with US help, possibly 23 nuclear power stations across the country by 2000. A West German company – Siemens – was contracted to build a reactor at Bushehr on the Persian Gulf coast.

All of this came to an end with the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The Siemens contract was canceled and Bushehr was put on hold. Then in 1984, goaded by the war with Iraq, Iran is suspected to have implemented a nuclear weapons program. Its overall nuclear program was further stimulated when Iran signed the 1989 nuclear technology cooperation agreement with the USSR. That led to two later agreements with Russia: (1) to cooperate on nuclear energy and (2) to re-construct the nuclear powerplant near the town of Bushehr. In 1995 Iran signed an agreement with Russia to complete the dual 1,000-1,300 megawatt pressurized light water nuclear reactors for the Bushehr complex.

In August 2002 an Iranian resistance group reported that Iran was building two nuclear processing facilities at Natanz and Arak.⁹ Then they claimed to have commercial satellite evidence that Iran was attempting to hide and harden those installations by enclosing them in thick walls and building them underground. Further investigation by the US and the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed that the Natanz facility would be a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant and that Arak would be a heavy

⁸For a more complete description of HizbAllah International see PLRC-030503 -- *Understanding the "War on Terrorism": "Pax Americana" and Preemptive Force.*

⁹This resistance group called the Mujaheddin-e Khalq, also known as the People's Mujaheddin (holy warriors), is on the US list of terrorist organizations. Their base in Iran, just across the border from Iraq, was bombed during the US invasion of Iraq. However, weapons experts and intelligence officials say past information from this group has been reliable because of their well-placed sources in the Iranian government.

water manufacturing plant to support the type of reactor normally used for producing weapons-grade plutonium.¹⁰

A month later, in September 2002, Iran went public about an ambitious nuclear power program that included mining and processing uranium.¹¹ Although the nuclear facilities mentioned above were not publicly declared until they were discovered, Iran claimed they are part of that civilian program. On the following day, Iran's nuclear energy chief for the first time announced two other plants associated with their nuclear program. One, for early processing of uranium ore near Isfahan. The other is a uranium mining complex near Saghand.

In an extensive televised speech on 9 February 2003, then Iranian President Mohammad Khatami gave a more detailed description of his country's nuclear program: (1) Dual pressurized light water reactors being built near Bushehr. (2) Uranium mining near Saghand in Yazd Province. (3) Uranium conversion plant near Isfahan. (4) Heavy water production plant near Arak. (5) Gas centrifuge plant near Natanz.¹² [Appendix-A provides a map showing the location of all these facilities.]

All of this activity gives Iran three possible avenues toward producing a nuclear bomb. First, it is possible to use spent fuel from the light water reactors at Bushehr to produce weapons grade plutonium. Second, spent fuel from a heavy water reactor could more easily be used to produce weapons grade plutonium. Third, centrifuges could enrich indigenously-mined uranium or imported uranium to weapons grade.¹³ I will address each of these possible avenues later in more detail.

Geopolitics of Oil and Gas.

Iran sits over a sea of oil and gas. They top its list of natural resources, and oil accounts for 80 percent of the country's export earnings. Iran is OPEC's second largest oil producer. It holds 9 percent of the world's oil reserves and 15 percent of its natural gas reserves.

¹⁰On 27 May 2003 this same resistance group reported two additional previously-undisclosed uranium-enrichment facilities at Lashkar Ab'ad and Ramandeh Village. These are, according to the group, backup facilities in case the Natanz facility is bombed. Lashkar Ab'ad was determined to be a defunct laser isotope separation facility. Activities at Ramandeh Village have not been confirmed. Three other suspected sites which have not been confirmed by the IAEA are Parchin, Lavizan II, and Chalous.

¹¹The UN's International Atomic Energy Agency said it had known for several years that Iran planned to mine and process uranium ore.

¹²Iran has five other research reactors which are monitored by the IAEA. A 5,000 kilowatt reactor for radioisotope production near Tehran was furnished by the US and fueled by Argentina. The other four were furnished by China and are near Isfahan. They are a 30 kilowatt miniature neutron source reactor for isotope production, a heavy water zero-power reactor for research, a graphite sub-critical reactor now decommissioned, and a light water sub-critical reactor for research.

¹³Uranium enrichment refers to the percentage of the Uranium-235 isotope in the Uranium. Low-enriched fuels for light water reactors is 3%-5%. Weapons grade fuel is about 90% enriched.

During the early 1950s, Iran's oil was controlled by the Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC -- later renamed British Petroleum and now conglomerated to become BP-Amoco-Arco). Indigenous unrest soon surfaced because America and Britain took such a huge share of the profits and dominated Iranian economics. Mohammed Musaddig became Iran's prime minister in April 1951 and the following month he nationalized the country's oil industry. A dispute followed and a satisfactory agreement could not be reached with AIOC.

Britain started planning a coup and the CIA was brought in during November 1952. Musaddig was overthrown in August of the following year and Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was installed to head the government. What followed was a brutal dictatorship which kept the country "stable" for the oil companies.

Repression of the Shiite majority by a secular government for a quarter century eventually came to a head with the Islamic Revolution of 1979. US and British oil companies were expelled, the Shah was sent into exile, and on 1 April 1979 the Islamic Republic of Iran was proclaimed under the supreme rule of an Ayatollah. Then followed the bloody and indecisive 8-year war with Iraq.¹⁴ By the mid-1990s, despite huge oil export revenues, some 53 percent of the Iranian population still lived in poverty.

Iran's nuclear program and support for terrorism could very well be used as an excuse for the Bush administration to start a war that would regain control of Iran's oil. In addition, Iran is the optimal route for a pipeline to market oil from Central Asia and the Caspian Basin.¹⁵ Having control of Iran would open Central Asia to greater oil exploitation by American companies.

Iran's strategic position on the north side of the Persian Gulf is also a consideration. It could interfere with oil production in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates. That is threatening half the world's known supply of oil. In addition, Iran straddles the Strait of Hormuz through which oil tankers daily carry 90% of the oil exports from the Persian Gulf, according to the US Department of Energy.

Being a major exporter of oil and natural gas to China, India, and Japan gives Iran some strong influence in world affairs. Looking east to find markets and influence is creating competition for the US, especially with the sanctions the US has imposed on Iran.

China in 2005 received 14.7% of its oil imports from Iran, and that is expected to grow.¹⁶ A \$70-billion contract signed on 29 October 2004 gives 51% development rights of Iran's Yadavaran oil field to China's government-controlled Sinopec energy company. Yadavaran is scheduled to begin production in 2009. China also agreed to buy 10 million metric tons of liquified natural gas per year from Iran over the next 25 years.

India's state-owned ONGC Videsh Ltd. oil and gas company signed a \$40-billion contract with Iran on 7 January 2005 for a 20% stake in developing the Yadavaran field. ONGC Videsh Ltd. also acquired a

¹⁴Of course, after being expelled from Iran, the US sided with Iraq.

¹⁵See PLRC-021016 for a full description of the oil and gas interests in Central Asia and the Caspian Basin.

¹⁶Based on January to October imports.

100% stake in the Jeyfr oil field. India also agreed to purchase 7.5 million metric tons of liquified natural gas per year from Iran for 25 years. In addition, India and Pakistan are negotiating a \$3-4 billion natural gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan.

A consortium of three Japanese companies in early 2003 negotiated a 20% stake in one of Iran's off shore oil fields in the Persian Gulf. In February 2004, Japan's government-controlled Inpex Corp. signed a \$2.5-billion contract with Iran for 75% development of Azadegan oil field. Japan plans to let out approximately 20% of its stake to foreign countries, of which France's Total is one contender. Development will begin in 2006 and production is scheduled to start in 2008. Separate from the Azadegan project, the state-owned Japan Bank of International Cooperation made a \$3 billion loan to Iran to secure a supply of crude oil. Another loan of an undisclosed amount was made in 2004. The US has objected strongly to Japan doing business with Iran but the bank spokesman says "Japanese policy will have to consider many issues including the security of oil supplies."¹⁷

Aside from Iran, Japan receives 78% of its oil imports from Persian Gulf nations which would be affected if the Strait of Hormuz were blocked.¹⁸ Japan is not likely to support and measures that would endanger oil flow from that region.

The bottom line in neo-conservative ambitions for control of East Asia and the Middle East is oil and gas. Iran sits right in the middle of those ambitions.

D OES IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM VIOLATE THE NPT?

After the secret nuclear sites became known, the Bush administration was adamant that Iran had a nuclear weapons program and pressured the IAEA to declare that country in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Agency officials said it was too early for that. In early May 2003, IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said: "We are at the moment in the process of conducting inspections in Iran and of doing analysis at IAEA headquarters, and at this point we are reserving judgment about the nature of Iran's nuclear program."¹⁹

The NPT and the IAEA.

Why was the IAEA reluctant to hold Iran in violation of the NPT? Possibly the first reason is that Article IV of the NPT guarantees that member states can process nuclear fuel for commercial electricity generation. Article IV, Paragraph 1 reads: "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for

¹⁷Bloomberg, 22 February 2004.

¹⁸2003 figures per *Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet*, September 2003.

¹⁹Cited by Associated Press, 9 May 2003.

peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” Articles I and II essentially forbid the creation of new nuclear weapons states by any means – development, manufacture, purchase, transfer, etc. It is because of Article IV that Iran rightfully insists it has an inalienable right to develop the entire fuel cycle for peaceful purposes.

There is more. Iran signed the NPT as a non-nuclear state in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. But the original treaty had a loophole that allowed construction of a pilot nuclear fuel enrichment plant without declaring it for IAEA inspections until 180 days before nuclear fuel was introduced into the plant. Under those conditions, Iran did not violate the treaty by building the plants secretly. The secrecy does, however, show bad faith and destroys confidence -- especially since, at that time, all signatories to the NPT except Iran had signed a supplemental agreement plugging that loophole.

Iran since the discovery of its secret program has signed that loophole-plugging agreement, but it still refused to sign another “Advanced Safeguards Protocol” (also referred to as the Advanced Protocol), introduced in 1997, which allows IAEA inspectors greater intrusion by holding spot inspections with little notice to search for secret weapons programs. Without that leeway, weapons inspectors cannot adequately guarantee that undeclared parallel nuclear weapons programs do not exist.

The Bush administration postulated that Iran will merely give the required 90-day notice for abrogating the NPT when its nuclear program comes close to maturation, as North Korea did in 2002. Iran still insisted that its nuclear program was for peaceful purposes. And with what has been determined by the IAEA there is no violation of the NPT.

Before proceeding further, I should explain there are two types of nuclear bombs – uranium and plutonium. Weapons grade uranium is produced in the enrichment process. Weapons grade plutonium is extracted from spent reactor fuel rods. In explaining the three possible avenues to produce a nuclear bomb I will start with plutonium.

Producing Weapons Grade Plutonium From Light Water Reactors.

The twin reactors being constructed near Bushehr were destroyed during the 1980s war with Iraq. The 1995 agreement with Russia to rebuild them included the understanding that Russia would provide the low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel and that the spent fuel rods would be returned to Russia. Under that arrangement, Iran needs no nuclear processing program if it does, indeed, plan only a civilian nuclear power program. However, again under that arrangement, Iran would always be dependent on another country for reactor fuel.

Iran first announced its own uranium mining program of indigenous reserves. Then Tehran proclaimed that Iran should control the entire fuel cycle – from mining uranium to disposal of spent fuel rods – in order to have a self-sufficient nuclear power program. Moscow became worried that the reactors they were building could be used to make nuclear weapons. Yet the Russian economy prevented any cancellation of the Bushehr project. The first reactor – Bushehr-1 – was scheduled for completion in 2005.

Mining and milling are the first processes in the reactor fuel cycle. After the ore is mined, uranium must be separated from the earth, rock, etc. Milling consists of several steps to concentrate the uranium to one of its purified solid oxides (U_3O_8), called yellowcake because of its color. In its natural composition, yellowcake is about 0.7% U_{235} .

The yellowcake is then sent to a processing plant to produce uranium hexafluoride gas. First the yellowcake goes through several chemical reactions to obtain pure uranium trioxide (UO_3). UO_3 is then reduced with hydrogen to become uranium dioxide (UO_2). That in turn is reacted with hydrogen fluoride to form uranium tetrafluoride (UF_4). UF_4 is then reacted with fluorine gas to produce uranium hexafluoride gas (UF_6).

Uranium hexafluoride is then sent to an enrichment facility where multiple runs through gas centrifuges enrich it to the desired percentage of U_{235} . Low-enriched uranium (3%-5% U_{235}) is used for fuel in light water reactors. Research reactors use uranium enriched to around 20% U_{235} . Highly-enriched or weapons-grade uranium is about 90% U_{235} . To obtain the higher enrichment percentages the uranium compound is merely sent through the centrifuges more times. The waste that is left is called depleted uranium which is mostly U_{238} and has other military uses.

The first steps – the uranium mining and yellowcake milling – is taking place near Saghand in Yazd Province. China is believed to have helped with prospecting and mining. It is possible the mines were producing by the end of 2004. Iranian engineers predicted that the mines would produce 120,000 tons of uranium ore annually for 17 years.

Isfahan will be the processing plant where yellowcake is converted to uranium hexafluoride gas. China is believed to have furnished the blueprints for the uranium processing plant. Uranium hexafluoride would then be enriched at Natanz.

In addition to indigenously-mined uranium, the IAEA reported that Iran had failed to disclose 3,960 pounds of uranium which was imported from China in 1991.²⁰

It is when spent fuel rods are removed from the light water reactor that the questions about a plutonium weapons program begins. A reactor is the manufacturing device for plutonium, which can be extracted from the spent fuel and used for nuclear bombs. Plutonium bombs can be made much smaller than uranium bombs and thus are lighter and easier to deliver over greater distances.

To date, there are no known plutonium extraction facilities in Iran. Lacking those, there is no NPT violation.

²⁰2,200 pounds of uranium hexafluoride gas, 880 pounds of uranium tetrafluoride, and 880 pounds of uranium dioxide.

Producing Weapons Grade Plutonium From Heavy Water Reactors.

While acknowledging the heavy water production plant at Arak, Iran also had to admit plans for a heavy water reactor. A 5 May 2003 letter to the IAEA announced Iran's intention to build a heavy water reactor patterned after the Canadian CANDU reactor technology. Canada vigorously denied selling the technology to Iran. It is suspected that Russia helped Iran with the reactor technology. Voice of America said Iran planned to start construction in June 2004, next to the heavy water production plant at Arak.²¹ In March of 2005, diplomats close to the IAEA said Iran had laid the foundations for a 40 megawatt research reactor at Arak that could produce enough plutonium for one bomb a year.

Heavy water reactors make the fuel cycle simpler because natural uranium oxide does not have to be converted to uranium hexafluoride gas and then enriched to a higher U₂₃₅ content. Fuel for a heavy water reactor could come directly from Isfahan. Besides converting yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride, Isfahan can also produce uranium oxide²² and uranium metal.²³ Uranium oxide can be used as fuel in heavy water reactors. In addition, heavy water reactors can potentially burn the spent fuel from light water reactors.

Simply having a heavy water reactor is not evidence that a country has a nuclear weapons program. They are popular in many countries. Canada has built its CANDU reactors and no one would accuse Canada of having a weapons program. New designs are being developed mainly in Canada and India. There are seven countries which now operate 39 heavy water reactors and are building 8 more. According to the IAEA, "heavy water reactors are a significant proportion of the world reactor installations."²⁴

It is true that a heavy water reactor is the best facility for producing plutonium. But after the plutonium is produced in the reactor it must be extracted from the other elements of spent reactor fuel. As mentioned above, there is no evidence of any plutonium extraction facilities at Arak or anywhere else in Iraq. Lacking those, heavy water reactors do not violate the NPT.

²¹According to Wikipedia: "**Heavy water** is **deuterium oxide**, or D₂O or ²H₂O. Its physical and chemical properties are similar to those of normal water, H₂O, but the hydrogen atoms are of the heavy isotope deuterium, in which the nucleus contains a neutron in addition to the proton found in the nucleus of any hydrogen atom. This isotope substitution alters the bond energy of the hydrogen-oxygen bond in water, altering the physical and chemical properties of the substance.... Heavy water is used in certain types of nuclear reactors where it acts as a neutron moderator to slow down neutrons so that they can react with the uranium in the reactor. Light water also acts as a moderator but because light water absorbs neutrons, reactors using light water must use enriched uranium rather than natural uranium, otherwise criticality is impossible."

²²For the remainder of this paper I will use the term "uranium oxide" to refer to all the oxides of uranium.

²³The uranium metal raises serious concerns because there is very little use for it in civilian projects. It is used extensively in fabricating nuclear bombs.

²⁴IAEA Nuclear Power Technology Development Section; "Heavy Water Reactors,"

Using Centrifuges to Enrich Uranium to Weapons Grade.

Enrichment of Uranium to less than 5% U_{235} is necessary and common practice to produce fuel for commercial light water nuclear reactors. Having gas centrifuges for that purpose does not violate the NPT. When Iran started its secret research on enriching uranium it was at the Kalaye Electric Company located in the suburbs of Tehran.

Kalaye Electric Company.

In March, June, and July of 2003 the IAEA were not allowed to inspect Kalaye to perform environmental tests for purity of uranium enrichment. On August 9th Iran admitted that its uranium enrichment research from 1997 until 2002 was concentrated in Kalaye, which has since been closed. Inspectors were then told they could now take environmental samples. But the facility had been remodeled and rooms had been painted. A former Iranian security official said that six feet of topsoil had been removed from some areas and some rooms had been completely rebuilt.

Nevertheless, IAEA inspectors found some environmental samples containing enriched uranium at Kalaye. Iran claimed it was from residue on contaminated components when it bought the centrifuges from a foreign country. (Six months earlier Iran had said the centrifuges were indigenously designed.) Iran did not disclose which country had furnished them but the centrifuges matched a design used by Pakistan early in its nuclear program.

After further studying the uranium residue it was determined to have been enriched to 36% U_{235} . The tell-tale signature of the enrichment showed that it came from Russia – that is the only place it is known to have been used. Russia uses 36% enrichment in certain submarines and for some research reactors.

These environmental samples of “uranium enriched to 36% U_{235} have come almost entirely from one room in the Kalaye Electric Company workshop, which seems to be predominantly contaminated with the material. Only negligible traces of 36% enriched uranium have been found on imported centrifuge components. The level of contamination suggests the presence of more than just trace quantities of such material.”²⁵ That led inspectors to believe Iran bought 36% enriched uranium from the Russian black market, not the government. Had it been purchased through the government, Russian scientists could have masked the tell-tale signature.

The 36% enrichment is far higher than needed for a civilian reactor but still lower than weapons grade. Even so, if Iran wanted to secretly produce weapons grade uranium it would be a boost starting with 36% concentration. To make one bomb with the 36% enrichment would only require 66 pounds and employ 25 centrifuges. Starting from scratch with uranium hexafluoride would require 13,200 pounds of material and employ 750 centrifuges.

²⁵Persbo and Andrews, 5 March 2004.

But there are other possibilities which are just as reasonable. Iran may have bought the enriched fuel to dilute it to low-enriched uranium for light water reactors. Diluting highly enriched fuel is a simple and common process. United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is a global energy company that touts itself as “the world’s leading supplier of enriched uranium fuel for commercial nuclear powerplants.”²⁶ In 1994, USEC signed the first memorandum of agreement with the Department of Energy (DoE) for the “Megatons to Megawatts” program. The first contract was to “downblend” 14.2 metric tons of highly-enriched (average of 75% U_{235}) uranium. It was diluted to less than 5% U_{235} to produce 388 metric tons of reactor fuel. Later USEC contracted with the DOE to dilute another 46.1 metric tons of highly-enriched (average 40% U_{235}) uranium to produce 552.3 metric tons of commercial reactor fuel.

In 1993 the US (with USEC as its agent) signed an agreement with Russia to dilute some 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium from its dismantled nuclear warheads, over a 20 year period, to low-enriched commercial reactor fuel.

Obviously, the diluting (downblending) of highly-enriched uranium has been a common technology for a number of years. It is credible that Iran bought 36% enriched uranium to dilute for commercial reactor fuel, and that is permitted. Not having enriched it further, there was no NPT violation.

Natanz Pilot Enrichment Plant.

Then Iranian President Mohammad Khatami said in his 9 February 2003 speech that the facility at Natanz plant is a pilot plant scheduled for completion at end of 2003. The commercial plant is still under construction. Plans are to install about 1,000 centrifuges for the pilot plant. The commercial plant is expected to have over 50,000 centrifuges.

During a mid-July 2003 visit to Natanz, IAEA inspectors found highly-enriched uranium residue up to 90% U_{235} , which is weapons grade. This was again chalked up to inadvertent contamination of a purchased centrifuge. Nevertheless, the IAEA took the sample to determine its source.

In 2005, when a sample of Pakistan’s enriched uranium was obtained, scientific tests determined it was identical to the traces found at Natanz. Yet this trace amount of contamination, now empirically shown to have come from Pakistan, continues to be touted as a claim that Iran has enriched uranium to weapons grade and thus seeks a nuclear bomb.

When Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the father of the Pakistani bomb, was exposed as having illegally sold nuclear technology on the black market to other nations, it became clear that Pakistan had furnished the gas centrifuges to Iran. It also became apparent in February 2004 that Iran has a more advanced centrifuge – the Pak-2 or Pakistan-2 – than was declared to the IAEA. It is Pakistan’s second-generation, higher speed, and more advanced design.

²⁶About USEC.

Nevertheless, no matter what centrifuge is used, producing no more than low-enriched uranium is not a violation of the NPT.

THE PROS AND CONS

Virtually every international dispute has more than one side. To credibly negotiate a solution to satisfy all, the position of every side must be accurately known. The manner in which propaganda is generated and information skewed to convince citizens that their country's position is the correct position, merely aggravates the problem rather than solve it. Here I will discuss those positions.

Iran's Position.

With Russia, and possibly Europe and America, offering to furnish Iran with nuclear fuel and dispose of the waste, one may wonder why Iran is so adamant about pursuing such a controversial program. But one must also understand that the Iranian people are a proud race who value independence and autonomy. Iran knows it has a legal right under the NPT to develop its own fuel cycle and does not want to be dependent on other countries for furnishing and disposing of its reactor fuel. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told the UN General Assembly in 2005: "We are concerned that once certain powerful states completely control nuclear energy resources and technology, they will deny access to other states and thus deepen the divide between powerful countries and the rest of the international community ... peaceful use of nuclear energy without possession of a nuclear fuel cycle is an empty proposition."²⁷

Wikipedia goes on to explain: "Iran questions why it shouldn't be allowed to diversify its resources of energy, especially when there are fears of its oil fields eventually being depleted. It continues to argue that its valuable oil should be used for high value products, not simply electricity generation."²⁸

Iran further declares that the US is practicing a double standard regarding compliance with the NPT. Article VI – the so-called Good Faith Clause – reads in its entirety: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and **to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament** under strict and effective international control." (emphasis added.) Over the past 35+ years this part of the NPT has been completely ignored by the nuclear weapons states. Although the nuclear arms race is now essentially ended, the reduction in quantity of US nuclear weapons has been confined to those which are obsolete or won't work. The qualitative aspect of the arms race continues and more effective US nuclear weapons are still being developed. Iran says that as long as the nuclear powers – including Israel – hold on to their nuclear weapons there will be no chance of nuclear disarmament, to say nothing of complete and general disarmament.

²⁷Ahmadinejad, 17 September 2005.

²⁸Wikipedia, "Iran and weapons of Mass Destruction."

The US and EU Position.

The US and EU also have concerns, given Iran's past statements and support for terrorists. "A nuclear Iran in the region would severely increase the risks to Western countries (particularly the United States) of nuclear attack ..." And with regard to Israel: "Iran does not formally recognize Israel's right to exist, and Iranian authorities have called for Israel's destruction." Finally, concerning terrorism: "Iran is also thought to constitute more of a proliferation risk. Accusations that Iran supports Hamas and Islamic Jihad, organizations which many Western countries categorize as terrorists, have been common in the US, and there are accordingly fears that Iranian nuclear weapons could eventually find their way into the hands of Islamic militants who would have fewer scruples about using them than a nation state."²⁹

Iran's past behavior also raises strong suspicions regarding its claim that nuclear processing is only for peaceful purposes. Its reputation for secrecy, deception, resistance to transparency, and withholding information when declaring technical details does not build confidence that the country is sincere in negotiations. Davis and Ingram point out: "Realists would argue that Iran has clear motives for acquiring nuclear weapons. The country is situated in a war-plagued region (five major wars in less than 25 years). Iran is located between two regional nuclear weapons powers, Israel and Pakistan, and is encircled by US military forces in eleven neighboring countries. From the Iranian perspective, the United States is a hostile power that has labeled Iran part of an 'axis of evil' and recently removed the next-door regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran has also observed that the North Korean regime, which has declared that it now possesses nuclear weapons, has avoided US military attentions."³⁰

DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT

During the spring of 2003, the US was practically the only country pressuring Iran on its nuclear program. Then on 12 September 2003 the IAEA made an unprecedented demand for full cooperation from Iran, that Iran sign the Advanced Safeguards Protocol, and that Iran present an explanation of past infractions. IAEA gave Iran until October 31st to comply. IAEA member states supported the demand. Russia, Japan, and the European Union suspended many areas of cooperation. There was a danger that the issue would be referred to the UN Security Council for action and possible sanctions. Iran, still not willing to bend under western pressure, rejected the ultimatum.

Iran's Voluntary and Temporary Agreement,

About this same time, France, Germany, and Britain (the European Union-3, or EU-3) engaged Iran in diplomatic talks, offering incentives if its nuclear program were halted and complete transparency instituted. One incentive was a promise of increased trade, including helping Iran get into the World Trade

²⁹Wikipedia, "Iran and weapons of Mass Destruction."

³⁰Davis and Ingram, 23 November 2005.

Organization. Details on a host of incentives were to be worked out after a complete suspension of nuclear activities was in effect.

The fly in the ointment at this time was that the US would not join the EU-3 in diplomatic engagement although it paid lip service about supporting it. Furthermore, the US objected to Iran joining the World Trade Organization and furnishing Iran with spare commercial aircraft parts. In addition, most of the nuclear reactors in the world used US technology and could not be exported to a third country without US approval. The US would not give that approval so the EU could not offer and substantially aid in peaceful nuclear technology. The US position was obviously aimed at forcing the IAEA to refer Iran to the UN Security Council to face sanctions.

Regardless of the restrictions on EU-3 offers, they apparently gave Iran a face-saving excuse to be more cooperative. On 21 October 2003 Iran agreed to “suspend all enrichment – uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.”³¹ Iran stressed that this agreement was strictly voluntary on their part and that it was temporary pending successful negotiations. Iran was emphatic that it would not agree under any circumstances to give up its development of a complete reactor fuel cycle – something they had an inalienable right to develop. This voluntary action was called the Safeguard Agreement (as opposed to the Advanced Safeguards protocol).

Although Iran’s actions were accepted by the IAEA Board on November 26th, it was conditional, in light of past deceptions, on a continued showing of good faith. The resolution on that date stated that “should any further serious Iranian failures come to light, the Board of Governors would meet immediately to consider, in light of the circumstances and of advice from the Director General, all options at its disposal in accordance with the IAEA Statute and Iran’s Safeguards Agreements.”

Iran then signed the Advanced Safeguards Protocol on 18 December 2003, and provided documentation that showed it had been secretly seeking, out of view of nuclear inspectors, a uranium enrichment program for 18 years. The protocol has still not been ratified by the conservative Iranian parliament.

More Secret Programs Discovered.

After that declaration the Pak-2 centrifuge was discovered. This evidence of further secrecy on the part of Iran raised speculation on whether Iran had also received plans for a nuclear bomb from Khan’s black market, as it was discovered Libya had.

IAEA inspectors called for an inspection in March 2004. Citing a national holiday, Iran “delayed for a month, until mid-April, letting agency inspectors check locations where the Pak-2 centrifuges were housed, resulting in delayed sampling for nuclear clues.”³² There were accusations that Iran had cleaned up and concealed things while the inspection was delayed.

³¹Voice of America, 12 April 2004.

³²Broad and Sanger, 2 June 2004.

On 9 April 2004 Iran reassured the IAEA that it had, indeed, suspended uranium enrichment and related activities. Less than two months later the IAEA reported that three workshops in Iran were making centrifuge parts.³³ It also reported that Iran was preparing to make uranium hexafluoride and that the country had secretly pursued the purchase of magnets to manufacture some 4,000 Pak-2 centrifuges. Iran claimed its “voluntary suspension of enrichment activities” did not include manufacture of uranium hexafluoride.³⁴ Iran did admit it had purchased magnets for the Pak-2 centrifuge – something it had previously denied. It was apparently Iran’s position that centrifuges did not enrich uranium until they were actually used and that manufacture was allowed.

As of mid-2004 the Advanced Safeguards Protocol had still not been ratified by the Iranian parliament. There was serious resistance from conservative parliamentarians who were not in agreement with the Iranian administration. The IAEA Board passed a resolution in June which emphasized “the importance of Iran continuing to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to provide reassurance to the international community about the nature of Iran’s nuclear program.”³⁵ In addition, Iran was urged to ratify the Protocol without delay.

All of this time the US was constantly petitioning the IAEA Board to refer the matter to the UN Security Council. The Board consistently waffled. On 3 March 2004 the Board deferred until its June meeting “consideration of progress in verifying Iran’s declarations and how to respond to omissions.”³⁶ At the June 18th meeting, after discovering Iran was still working on centrifuge parts and uranium hexafluoride, and after finding Iran was fabricating Pak-2 centrifuges, the Board merely decided to stay seized on the matter. Also, the Director General had not advised on whether the Iranian issue should be referred to the Security Council – a requirement set forth in the 26 November 2003 IAEA Board resolution. By the end of 2004 the Bush administration was employing means, including wiretapping IAEA offices, to unseat Mohamed ElBaradei, an Egyptian, as Director General of the IAEA and install someone more favorable to the US position. That was unsuccessful.

The EU-3, also resisting Bush administration pressure to bring Iran before the Security Council, had by the end of 2004 stressed a policy of “constructive engagement” with Iran for over a year – something many US allies have strongly urged the White House to join. But Iran continued to send mixed signals. Besides blocking ratification of the Advanced Safeguards Protocol, hardliners in Iran want the EU to offer more. While Iran had agreed with the EU-3 on an enrichment freeze in October 2003, and restated that freeze in various terms since, parliamentary hardliners insisted that Iran continue peaceful nuclear research with 20 centrifuges (which could eventually produce enough weapons grade uranium for a bomb). Frustrated

³³Iran did stop production of centrifuge parts in three workshops. According to the IAEA report, the three others still operating were private companies who said they had to finish their contract with the government in order to be paid.

³⁴Quoted in Broad and Sanger, 2 June 2004.

³⁵Quoted in Persbo, 12 June 2004.

³⁶Quotations in this paragraph cited in Persbo, 12 June 2004.

with Iran's vacillations, the EU-3 broke off talks again on 27 November 2004. Iran was given until the end of the next day to accept a full freeze or the EU-3 would propose a tough resolution at the IAEA meeting. Iran relented and accepted a voluntary full freeze.

The Board of Governors of the IAEA released another resolution implementing the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran on 29 November 2004.³⁷ It welcomes Iran's nuclear freeze and "Iran's continuing voluntary commitment to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional protocol ... and calls on Iran once again to ratify its Protocol soon;..." while at the same time reaffirming "strong concern that Iran's policy of concealment up to October 2003 has resulted in many breaches of Iran's obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement;..." The resolution then underlines "the continuing importance of Iran extending full and prompt cooperation to the Director General ... and requests Iran as a confidence building measure to provide any access deemed necessary by the Agency in accordance with the Additional Protocol:..."³⁸

ALL STICK AND NO CARROTS

Diplomatic engagement with Iran has been unsuccessful because, due to US intransigence, the EU-3 cannot make any meaningful concessions. The EU-3 can make no offers without US approval because Washington had veto power over World Trade Organization membership and controls the technology for Nuclear powerplants. In Early February 2005 John Burton, the EU representative to the US said: "There has to be a sense that there will be a US buy-in to the solution."³⁹ Several European foreign ministers see the Bush administration as too confrontational. And they feel that any incentive package to Iran would founder without US participation.

In early March of 2005, after his trip to Europe and meetings with European leaders, Bush added a token carrot to the what the EU-3 can offer in negotiations. He said the US will drop its objection to Iran applying for membership in the World Trade Organization and he would approve the sale of spare parts for commercial Iranian aircraft. But the US is not offering anything, just removing some roadblocks. Although Bush and Rice consistently say they support negotiations, it is their opinion that Iran should not be rewarded for something they should be doing anyway. Concern for Iran's support of terrorism was also again voiced.

³⁷See GOV/2004/90.

³⁸Quotations in this paragraph from GOV/2004/90.

³⁹Weisman, Sciolino, and Sanger, 4 February 2005.

Framework Agreement Proposed by the EU-3.

Iran could see that the EU-3 were unable to offer any meaningful concessions without US approval. It was also displeased with the removal of token roadblocks that the US touted as a contribution to negotiations. On 3 May 2005 Iran announced that it would soon restart its nuclear activities at Isfahan. EU-3 negotiators rebutted with a threat to call off all negotiations if that was done, even though it did not actually entail enriching.

In response, Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, urged the US and Europe to define better what kind of economic development they would offer. He also said: “I firmly believe that any grand bargain will have to involve the United States because on the security side, only the US can do the heavy lifting.” US State Secretary Rice made the standard reply: “There has to be a very clear commitment from the Iranians to live up to their international obligations not to seek a nuclear weapon under the cover of civilian nuclear power.”⁴⁰

When asked for a specific example of the type of incentive Iran expects Hossein Mousavian, a negotiator representing Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said: “Europe can agree in principle to a contract for 10 nuclear power plants for Iran.”⁴¹ But because American companies hold the licenses for most modern powerplants, that type of deal would be impossible without US approval.

By suggesting they were ready to present a detailed plan to meet Iran’s need for nuclear reactors, the EU-3 were able to persuade Iran to continue its voluntary freeze a little longer.

Arch conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran in June and sworn in on 6 August 2005.

In early August the IAEA agreed to Iran’s request to install surveillance cameras in all the nuclear facilities at Isfahan. Once that is done – about a week – Iran could legally continue to produce uranium hexafluoride gas. It would, however, be breaking their voluntary agreement not to continue nuclear activities as long as negotiations were in progress. The EU-3 sent a letter backed by the 25-nation European Union that negotiations would end if Iran started work at Isfahan. That would mean referring the issue to the security council. Iran rejected the warning because it would be unlikely for the Security Council to impose sanctions when Iran is operating legally.

On 5 August the EU-3 presented what was supposed to fulfill their promise to outline what they can offer as incentives to give up their nuclear program – the 34-page (in English) “Framework for a Long-Term Agreement Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and France, Germany & United Kingdom with the Support of the High Representative of the European Union.” The British American Security Information Council analysis of the offer stated:

⁴⁰Quotations from Hoge and Sanger, 4 May 2005.

⁴¹MacFarquhar, 19 May 2005.

In general the document is **vague on incentives and heavy on demands**. It proposes new processes for further dialogue with the potential for cooperation in a number of areas, but few concrete offers. The demands upon Iran in contrast are specific and uncompromising. The language and speed of the Iranian response suggest they either feel betrayed by the E3/EU's failure to offer more significant incentives or that they had predetermined to reject any offer which did not show flexibility on the crucial question of uranium enrichment.... In any event, the proposal is not impressive. (Emphasis in original.)⁴²

Iran Ends Its Voluntary Moratorium on Nuclear Production.

The EU-3 offer was immediately and angrily rejected by Iran. "The proposal self-righteously assumes rights and licenses for the EU-3 which clearly go beyond or even contravene international law and assumes obligations for Iran which have no place in law or practice."⁴³

Three days after the offer was made, August 8th, Iranian scientists dumped a barrel of yellowcake at the Isfahan plant while the IAEA and the world's press looked on. Production of uranium hexafluoride was restarted at the processing facility.

Iran's not unexpected rejection of the EU-3 offer brought angry responses from the western world. President Bush was asked by Israel Channel One television at his Crawford, Texas ranch if one of the possible options now was the use of force. He came back with his timeworn response: "As I say, all options are on the table." Then, adding a little spice to his reply, he added: "The use of force is the last option for any president and you know we've reached force in the recent past to secure our country."⁴⁴ Nevertheless, Washington decided to give negotiations a little more time.

Although the IAEA expressed serious concern about Iran's intentions, it came out with information that exonerated Iran and confirmed that Iran was telling the truth about not yet having enriched uranium. During May of 2005 the IAEA obtained samples of residue from centrifuges in Pakistan. Scientific comparisons made in August of those samples with the weapons-grade uranium residue found at Natanz showed they matched. This removed any chance of referral to the Security Council at this time.

During October and November the rhetoric heated up. This prompted the British American Security Information Council to coordinate a statement "by 50 experts in nuclear security, conflict prevention, and Middle East affairs ..."⁴⁵ It was announced in a media release on December 6th. The statement emphasized: "*The US and EU have to recognize the limits of their influence and their threats....*

⁴²Ingram, 11 August 2005.

⁴³Response of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Framework Agreement Proposed by EU#/EU, August 2005.

⁴⁴Reuters, 13 August 2005.

⁴⁵BASIC Media Release, 6 December 2005.

*Diplomacy and creative compromise on all sides are the only acceptable choice.*⁴⁶ (Italics in original.)

The media release then expands on that quotation:

... the current EU/US strategy makes rigid demands of Iran without adequate treaty authority, appears discriminatory, and is likely to strengthen the Iranian government's resolve to pursue nuclear technology and a weapons capability. Threats to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for punitive action lack credibility and do not have sufficient international support....

Iran's past concealment of important parts of its nuclear program and the wholly unacceptable threats toward Israel recently reiterated by President Ahmadinejad fully justifies international concern. However, inflexibility on the part of the EU and US has also damaged prospects of a negotiated settlement.⁴⁷

Iran threw down the gauntlet on 3 January 2006 with a letter to the IAEA saying it's enrichment facility would resume research and development on its "peaceful nuclear energy program."⁴⁸ On January 10th, Iran invited IAEA inspectors to view the removal of seals at the Natanz enrichment facility, the two main halls of which are buried underground. These seals were removed that same day and Iran began what it termed research on nuclear fuel including some small-scale enrichment. Mohammed Saeedi, deputy director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization announced: "research has nothing to do with nuclear fuel production and is a separate issue."⁴⁹

Russia had been trying to broker a compromise whereby Iran would enrich its uranium hexafluoride in Russia where it would be strictly monitored. It angered both Russia and China when Iran restarted its Natanz plant. They both sent letters of objection to Iran. Russia said it would not block an IAEA Board referral of the case to the Security Council. China, not wanting to be the only one to veto such an action is expected to abstain from voting. Although all the parties involved claim that military action isn't in the cards at present, US State Secretary Rice parroted the same shopworn line: "The president of the United States never takes any of his options off the table and nobody would want the president to do that."⁵⁰

It would take a majority of the 35 members on the IAEA Board to refer Iran to the Security Council. If that is done, there is a spectrum of options the Security Council can take, ranging from a simple letter of reprimand to the more severe economic sanctions.⁵¹ Rather than immediately taking action, the IAEA Board set a meeting for February 2nd to discuss the issue. Moscow still trying to persuade Iran to accomplish enrichment in Russia, something Iran has not outright rejected but which would be precluded

⁴⁶Quoted in BASIC Media Release, 6 December 2005.

⁴⁷BASIC Media Release, 6 December 2005.

⁴⁸Daniszewski, 5 January 2006.

⁴⁹Quoted in Daniszewski, 5 January 2006.

⁵⁰Quoted in Reuters, 12 January 2006.

⁵¹Other possible actions could be limits on travel, freezing bank accounts, and banning participation in international sporting events.

if the Security Council put a ban on all nuclear cooperation. It is not expected that Russia would approve any serious sanctions because of its multi-billion dollar investment in the Bushehr reactor.

Likewise, China is too dependent of oil from Iran and the Middle East to approve economic sanctions for Iran which would disrupt oil flow from the Middle East. Besides receiving almost 15 percent of its oil from Iran, another 31% comes from Persian Gulf Countries (Saudi Arabia and Oman).⁵² Both Russian and China have veto power on the Security council.

Iran responded with threats. Foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki threatened that “all voluntary means of cooperation” would end if Iran is referred to the Security Council. That would mean “the European countries would lose the means that are currently at their disposal” to know what Iran is doing on its nuclear project. The IAEA would be ousted from the country.

On 23 January 2006 Iran announced it will go from research to full scale enrichment if referred to the Security Council. But at the same time an Iranian diplomat traveled to Moscow to discuss the joint venture enrichment program.

That is where the situation stands as this paper is completed. From just the US being concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, the anxiety has spread to the European Union and even Russia and China. Virtually all countries are worried about an Iranian bomb and urging Iran to relent on its nuclear program. Meanwhile, Moscow continues to try to persuade Iran to do its uranium enrichment under the close supervision of Russia. And, in spite of the rhetoric, there is some indication that Iran is still open to a diplomatic solution. “Citing high-ranking government sources, German magazine *Der Spiegel* reported Saturday [21 January 2006] that German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier received a message from the Iranian government, saying that Iran would be willing to negotiate a joint venture uranium enrichment program with Russia or China.”

PREPARING FOR REGIME CHANGE IN IRAN

A media campaign to prepare the American people and the world for regime change in Iran has already begun. On 31 March 2003, while ‘major military activities’ in Iraq were still in progress, then Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton (now US Ambassador to the United Nations), a staunch neo-conservative,⁵³ emphasized that the Bush administration would give “extremely high priority” to stopping Iran’s nuclear weapons program.⁵⁴ He joined then

⁵²Based on January to October 2005 imports.

⁵³Although the term “neo-conservative” may have a more specific meaning, I will use that term in this paper to designate those individuals who advocate that America be strong militarily and use that strength to control US interests throughout the world.

⁵⁴Cited in Johnson.

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice in saying that the Bush administration viewed regime change in Iran as an initial response to a series of threats.^{55, 56}

In April 2003, Bush repeated his past vows to confront “any outlaw regime that has ties to terrorist groups and seeks to possess weapons of mass destruction.”⁵⁷ Shortly thereafter, senior Bush administration officials started the rhetoric with such statements as the US having “rock-hard intelligence” that at least a dozen Al Qaida members have been “directing some operations from Iran,” while at the same time citing security reasons for not supplying the proof.⁵⁸ *Deja vu*.

The situation worsened after the May 12th suicide bombings in Saudi Arabia which killed 34 people. US intelligence implied that Al Qaida cells inside Iran planned and coordinated the attack. The Bush administration cut off all contact with Iran, including the UN-sponsored talks between the two countries.⁵⁹

In July 2004, “President George Bush promised that if re-elected in November he would make regime change in Iran his new target.”⁶⁰

In August it was reported by *Newsday* that “at least two Pentagon officials working for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith have held ‘several’ meetings with Manucheh Ghorbanifar (the Iranian middleman in US arms-for-hostage shipments to Iran in the mid-1980s).”⁶¹ The two officials were identified as Harold Rhode^{62, 63} (top Middle East specialist) and Larry Franklin (Defense Intelligence Agency analyst). *Newsday* also reported that a “senior official and another administrative source who confirmed that the meetings had taken place said that the ultimate policy objective of Feith and a group of

⁵⁵Cited in Johnson.

⁵⁶Later, as Secretary of State, Rice tried to soft pedal the term “regime change.” (See Prelude.)

⁵⁷Cited in Jehl and Schmitt.

⁵⁸Cited in Jehl and Schmitt.

⁵⁹Diplomatic ties were severed between the US and Iran after the 1979 Islamic revolution. However, since the Taliban was ousted from Afghanistan, top US and Iranian officials have met occasionally in Geneva to discuss various issues. These meetings have now been canceled.

⁶⁰Johnston, 18 July 2004.

⁶¹Royce and Phelps, 8 August 2003.

⁶²Rhode was the liaison between the Pentagon and former Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi when Feith was crafting America’s post-war Iraq policy. Chalabi was discredited by the CIA but the Pentagon groomed him anyway. Although close to Iranian leaders, Chalabi has now been appointed oil minister of Iraq.

⁶³*Newsday* reports that Harold Rhode is a protégé of Michael Ledeen, a National Security Council consultant in the 1980s who introduced Ghorbanifar to Oliver North. Ledeen is now a Scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute and is an ardent advocate for regime change in Iran.

neoconservative civilians inside the Pentagon is regime change in Iran.”⁶⁴ And those meetings could very well have laid the groundwork for what has happened since.

At the beginning of Bush’s second term, in early February 2005, Condoleezza Rice made her first trip to Europe as Secretary of State. During that trip she propagated the language for the Bush administration’s policy toward Iran which distanced itself from the term “regime change.” We believe in negotiations, she said, and there is still time for diplomatic engagement. According to Rice, the US has no plans to attack Iran **at this time**. But then she sharpens the edge of US policy by stating that the president is not taking any options off the table.

Since then, that has been the announced US policy and has been repeated *ad nauseam*. Every speech about Iran by Bush, every mention of Iran policy by Rice, and every White House press conference on Iran refers in one way or another to options on the table while supporting negotiations by the EU-3. Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels cited the secret of his success as “Keep it simple, say it often.” The Bush administration is certainly doing that.

So the Bush administration waits while the EU-3 try to negotiate with nothing they can offer. All this time the US continues to push for the IAEA to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. Bush administrative officials are well aware that the Security Council may be powerless to impose sanctions because China and Russia will undoubtedly veto such a proposal.⁶⁵ That is probably the very thing the Bush administration is waiting for. Then it can declare the Security Council impotent to solve the crisis and organize another “coalition of the willing” to save the world from terrorists. In fact, The US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton expressed “that any failure by the UN Security Council to deal with Iran would damage the Security Council’s relevance, implying that the US would solve the problem on its own.”⁶⁶ Meanwhile, preparations are taking place to do just that.

Redeployment of Troops.

In 2003 the Pentagon conducted the classified “Operational Availability Study” to consider how it would re-shuffle US troops around the globe. The goal was for each military branch to restructure itself to deploy to a distant theater in 10 days, defeat the enemy within 30 days, and be ready to re-deploy again within another 30 days. In mid-2004 the US had about 100,000 troops in Europe, 47,000 in Japan, and 37,000 in South Korea. The plan boiled down to moving about 60,000 troops out of Europe (mainly Germany) and 30,000 from East Asia (mainly Japan and South Korea).

⁶⁴Royce and Phelps, 8 August 2003.

⁶⁵The five permanent members of the Security Council – the US, Russia, Britain, France, and China – have veto power over any action the Security Council proposes.

⁶⁶Plesch, 18 October 2005.

After the re-shuffle there will still be about 190,000 of America's 1.4 million troops stationed abroad. Pentagon officials say "the goal is to create more flexibility to send forces to the Middle East, Central Asia and other sites of potential conflicts."⁶⁷ *Toronto Sun* reporter Eric Margolis puts it more bluntly: "Meanwhile, the US will open new bases in Bulgaria and Romania as part of America's new 'imperial lifeline.' They will be linked to US bases being built across Central Asia, Pakistan, Iraq and the Gulf, designed to cement Washington's hold on the Muslim world and its natural resources."^{68, 69}

Margolis then goes on to point out that the US Navy is developing "littoral warfare" to project fire inland and to land troops. The US Air Force has developed "bare base" operations to deploy "strike packages" of aircraft to outlying bases, such as those in Central Asia,

Appendix-B illustrates the US bases surrounding Iran. (Basing may have increased in Iraq, Bulgaria, and Romania. The US has given up its base in Uzbekistan.)

Predators Over Iran.

It became publicly known in February 2005 that the CIA and Special Operations Forces had been flying Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (called drones) over Iran since the spring of 2004. Flying both high and low, these drone spy planes use radar and visual imaging as well as air filters to sniff out nuclear activity, to gather information unattainable by satellites. The drones are based in Iraq.

This type of reconnaissance is considered a normal precursor to an air attack. If the drones can tease the Iranians into turning on their radar and activating their command/control facilities, much could be learned – frequency, range, locations, and any weaknesses. But it didn't work. The Iranian decision was to not engage the US drones in any way and thus deprive US forces of vital information about the Iranian air defense system. This was a smart move on their part and one Iranian official commented: "The United States must have forgotten that they trained half our guys."⁷⁰ What the US does know, however, is that the Iranian air defense system is still mostly old technology installed during the reign of the Shah.

⁶⁷Bumiller, 15 August 2004.

⁶⁸Margolis, 22 August 2004.

⁶⁹Congress in May 2005 received a report from a government commission that identified Bulgaria and Romania as two countries US troops would rotate through for training. The Pentagon complained that, rather than specifying the countries, the report should have used a more vague description such as eastern Europe. Although the commission insists all its information came from public sources, the Pentagon accused it of disclosing classified information.

⁷⁰Quoted in Linzer, 13 February 2005.

The US has also sent “small reconnaissance teams directly into Iranian territory. These actions, first revealed by Seymour Hersh in *The New Yorker* in January, are supposedly intended to pinpoint the location of hidden Iranian weapons facilities for possible attack by US air and ground forces.”⁷¹

It is also reported that the CIA and Special Operations Forces are meeting clandestinely with members of the Iranian opposition to arrange for proxy forces to supplement a US strike against Iran.⁷²

Iran Warns of Retaliation.

Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani warned as far back as August 2004 that Iran would contemplate a preemptive attack against US forces in the region if there were danger of an attack on its nuclear facilities. “We will not sit (with arms folded),” he said, “to wait for what others will do to us. Some military commanders in Iran are convinced that preemptive operations which the Americans talk about are not their monopoly.” When Shamkhani was asked about an attack on the Bushehr power plant by Israel, he responded: “We will consider any strike against our nuclear installations as an attack on Iran as a whole, and we will retaliate with all our strength.” He continued: “Where Israel is concerned, we have no doubt that it is an evil entity, and it will not be able to launch any military operation without an American green light. You cannot separate the two.”⁷³

General Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, commander of Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guard, added: “If Israel fires one missile at Bushehr atomic power plant, it should permanently forget about Dimona nuclear center, where [Israel] produces and keeps its nuclear weapons, and Israel would be responsible for the terrifying consequence of this move.”⁷⁴

The threat was repeated the following February (2005). As thousands braved the heavy snow to commemorate the 26th anniversary of the Islamic revolution, then President Mohammad Khatami said: “the world must know that this nation will not tolerate an invasion.” He then threatened: “If the invaders reach Iran, the country will turn into a burning hell for them.”⁷⁵

Then followed another threat on March 1st. Iran threatened to close the two-mile wide Strait of Hormuz, through which 90% of the oil from the Persian Gulf is shipped (roughly two-fifths of all world traded oil)⁷⁶, and otherwise obstruct oil shipments if it attacked. Mohsen Rezai, secretary of the Iranian Expediency

⁷¹Klare, 21 July 2005.

⁷²See Klare, 21 July 2005.

⁷³Quotations from Agence France Presse, 19 August 2004.

⁷⁴Quoted in Agence France Presse, 19 August 2004.

⁷⁵Quotations from Paivar, 10 February 2005.

⁷⁶*Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet*, September 2004.

Council, stated: “An attack on Iran will be tantamount to endangering Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and, in a word, the entire Middle East oil.”⁷⁷

Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 6th: “We judge Iran can briefly close the Strait of Hormuz, relying on a layered strategy using predominantly naval, air, and some ground forces.”⁷⁸ It was undoubtedly because of that possibility, and Iran’s threat, that during March the US Navy shifted three aircraft carrier battle groups closer to the Middle East. The *USS Theodore Roosevelt* was moved from the Atlantic toward the Mediterranean Sea. Another aircraft carrier was also dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean and the *USS Carl Vinson* left Singapore for the Persian Gulf area.

Things heated up more after the June 2005 election when president Mohammad Khatami, a reformist who advocated international dialogue, was defeated. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the election and was inaugurated in August. At a “World Without Zionism” conference in October, Ahmadinejad echoed the sentiments of Ayatollah Khomeini, initiator of the Islamic Revolution, saying Israel is a “disgraceful blot” and should be “wiped off the map.” He went on to condemning several Persian Gulf states that were thawing relations with Israel: “Anybody who recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nation’s fury.”⁷⁹

Ahmadinejad’s speech brought a wave of global condemnation. Washington retorted that the speech justifies fears of an Iranian bomb. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan voiced dismay and reminded Ahmadinejad that Iran is a UN signatory which has undertaken not to threaten the use of force against another state. The UN Security Council issued a statement condemning Ahmadinejad’s remarks. Even Ebrahim Yazdi, former foreign minister of Iran, said: “Such statements provoke the international community against us. It’s not to Iran’s interests at all. It’s harmful to Iran to make such a statement.”⁸⁰

Perhaps French President Jacques Chirac’s reaction to Iran’s ranting was the most sinister. After pointing out that French strategic forces have been reconfigured to make precise tactical strikes in a regional war, he said: “The leaders of states who would use terrorist means against us, as well as those who would envision using ... weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they would lay themselves open to a

⁷⁷Quoted in Klare, 11 April 2005.

⁷⁸Quoted in Klare, 11 April 2005.

⁷⁹26 October 2005 by President Ahmadinejad over Iran’s state-run television. Quoted by Karimi, 26 October 2005.

⁸⁰Quoted by Karimi, 26 October 2005.

firm and fitting response on our part. ... The flexibility and reaction of our strategic forces allow us to respond directly against the centers of power.”^{81, 82}

Adding Israel to the Regime Change Equation.

On Inauguration day in January 2005 Vice President Dick Cheney “said Iran was ‘right at the top’ of the administration’s list of world trouble spots and expressed concern that Israel ‘might well decide to act first’ to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. The Israelis would let the rest of the world ‘worry about cleaning up the diplomatic mess afterward,’ he added in a radio interview ...”⁸³

That should have raised all kinds of red flags. Cheney was the first senior administrative official lending credibility to the threat of an Israeli strike. But his implication that the US would be unable to prevent such a strike is nonsense. It is not conceivable that Israel has missiles precise enough for such a mission – even cruise missiles in submarines. That leaves aircraft as the delivery system and they would have to fly over Iraq to reach their targets. There is no way that could happen without US support and cooperation. Nevertheless, the planning continues.

The planning is not easy. Iran has its nuclear facilities widely dispersed and that complicates preparation for a strike. The situation is not as simple as it was against Iraq which had its nuclear program concentrated at the Osirak facility. The US would have to at least lend support and cooperation even if Israel narrowed its targets down to just Natanz and Arak.

The following month President Bush confirmed that he would support Israel if it attacked Iran. On 17 February 2005, he was asked if he would back Israel if they tried to destroy Iran’s nuclear plants. After first expressing cautious optimism regarding negotiations, he then departed from the administration’s announced policy of having no plans to attack Iran, saying: “Clearly, if I was the leader of Israel and I’d listened to some of the statements by the Iranian ayatollahs that regarded the security of my country, I’d be concerned about Iran having a nuclear weapon as well. And in that Israel is our ally, and in that we’ve made a very strong commitment to support Israel, we will support Israel if her security is threatened.”^{84, 85}

⁸¹Quoted in Moore, 20 January 2006.

⁸²Ivan Oelrich, a nuclear physicist at the Federation of American Scientists said about Chirac’s threat: “That’s exactly the kind of message we should not be sending to the Iranians. ... That nuclear weapons are a vital part of my defense and I’m going to use them in response to a terrorist attack.” [Quoted in Moore, 20 January 2006.]

⁸³Richter, 21 January 2005.

⁸⁴Harris, 18 February 2005.

⁸⁵Bush’s words seem to imply some kind of military alliance treaty with Israel. That is not true. There is no treaty of that sort with Israel, at least none that have been ratified by the US Senate.

Perhaps allowing certain Israeli activity in northern Iraq is one way of support. The London *Guardian* reported that “Israeli firms are carrying out military training and commercial activities in Kurdish areas of north Iraq, according to reports in an Israeli newspaper. Yedioth Ahronoth reported yesterday that dozens of former members of Israel's elite and covert forces were training Kurdish fighters in anti-terrorism techniques.

And that is not all. *The Sunday Times* of London reports that Iran was designated by Israel as top priority in 2005 and that a massive Israeli intelligence operation has been underway ever since. “Cross-border operations and signal intelligence from a base established by the Israelis in northern Iraq are said to have identified a number of Iranian uranium enrichment sites unknown to the IAEA.”⁸⁶

After Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared that Israel should be wiped off the map on October 26th, it was disclosed that Israel's armed forces had been ordered on alert and were preparing for possible strikes against Iran by the end of March 2006. According to London's *Sunday Times*, “Defense sources in Israel believe the end of March to be the ‘point of no return’ after which Iran will have the technical expertise to enrich uranium in sufficient quantities to build a nuclear warhead in two to four years.”⁸⁷ Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon explained: “Israel – and not only Israel – cannot accept a nuclear Iran. We have the ability to deal with this and we're making all the necessary preparations to be ready for such a situation.”⁸⁸ It was confirmed that Israeli special forces went to “G” readiness during the first week of December – the highest stage of readiness for preceding an operation.

The *Jerusalem Post* reported on 15 January 2006 that Israeli Air Force pilots had completed training for a strike mission and their US-built F-15 fighters have been equipped with weapons; that two missile submarines are on standby – one in the Persian Gulf and the other in Haifa Bay; and that Israeli special forces are ready to strike by helicopter to take out targets that an air strike cannot destroy. Israel believes that Iran's nuclear facilities are dispersed at some 40 locations.

Uzi Dayan, former Israeli military deputy chief of staff believes that if Iran gets nuclear weapons, so would terrorist organizations. He said: “Israel needs to be ready to act on a military option.” Then after outlining what would be required to carry out a strike he added: “Without getting into details, Israel is capable of doing these things.”⁸⁹

But some experts point out that Israel cannot do it alone. Dr. Reuven Pedatzur, lecturer on Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, believes Israel would make a “disastrous strategic error” if it attacked Iran's nuclear plants. “The military option is not relevant, we simply do not have the right amount of intelligence and information, many of the targets are buried deep under ground. Only if the Americans decide to do

⁸⁶Mahnaimi and Baxter, 11 December 2005.

⁸⁷Mahnaimi and Baxter, 11 December 2005.

⁸⁸Quoted in Mahnaimi and Baxter, 11 December 2005.

⁸⁹*Jerusalem Post*, 15 January 2006.

it, then that option is possible.”⁹⁰ Well, perhaps the Americans, or at least those in control, have decided to do it.

Will regime Change be a Joint Operation?

It is not possible for Israel to attack Iran without at least US tacit consent. Israeli operations in northern Iraq already hint that the US is turning a blind eye. But US involvement seems to be more than that. Concern is growing in Germany that the US is preparing to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2006 – possibly early 2006. Fueling this concern is a December 23rd (2005) story carried by the German news agency DDP and written by Udo Ulfkotte, a journalist and intelligence expert with close ties to Germany’s foreign intelligence agency. “According to Ulfkotte’s report ‘western security sources’ claim that during CIA Director Porter Goss’ December 12th visit to Ankara, he asked Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to provide support for a possible 2006 air strike against Iranian nuclear and military facilities. More specifically, Goss is said to have asked Turkey to provide unfettered exchange of intelligence that could help the mission.”⁹¹ In return, according to DDP, Turkey was given the “green light” to strike separatist factions of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Iran on the day of US strikes.

Germany’s DDP news agency also indicated that Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman, and Pakistan were told that air strikes were possible but no dates were specified. Berlin’s *Der Tagesspiegel* reported on December 28th that western allies of the US had been informed that Washington was investigating possibilities of regime change in Iran that might include military activity.

Then there are the dossiers that always seem to be passed around to justify military action. According to the DDP report, three were given to Turkish security officials which claim to have evidence that Iran is cooperating with Al Qaida. Another purports to contain the current status of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Does all this sound familiar? Indications are that a strike on Iran will be a joint operation between the US and Israel.

I S THERE A SOLUTION?

We are faced with a dichotomous dilemma regarding Iran. On the one hand, the NPT gives Iran an inalienable right to enrich uranium for peaceful nuclear power generation. So far that is all anyone can prove is happening. But on the other hand, Iran has a history of secrecy and deception, and apparent connections with international terrorism. It would not be wise to allow Iran to clandestinely obtain a nuclear bomb which could very well fall into terrorist hands. So one choice is to take no action, assuming Iran is honest about only developing peaceful nuclear power. That choice would be foolhardy and very risky. Another choice is to do something to either dissuade Iran from its nuclear project or arrive at some way to feel comfortable in monitoring the project.

⁹⁰ *Jerusalem Post*, 15 January 2006.

⁹¹ *Spiegel Online*, 30 December 2005.

Before proceeding with the second choice it must be narrowed down. I see three avenues which may not be mutually exclusive – (1) economic sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, (2) preemptive force to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities and possibly bring regime change, and (3) more generous diplomatic engagement. I will discuss them in that order.

It is possible that the February 2nd meeting of the IAEA Board will refer Iran to the Security Council, or Russia and China, and possibly India, may cause a delay of that decision until March. Nevertheless, referral to the Security Council will undoubtedly come soon unless there is a significant change in Iran’s position. But once in the Security Council there is a wide range of actions that can be taken which cover the spectrum from a reprimand through minor sanctions to the most severe economic sanctions. It seems almost certain that Russia and China will veto economic sanctions because they have too great an economic interest in Iran. In addition, Iran’s ability to restrict oil exports from the Persian gulf area are likely to dissuade other countries from imposing such sanctions. Ironically, however, full economic sanctions could very well be all that the US will settle for. If the Security Council fails to impose them, which seems almost certain, then the US could in the words of John Bolton declare the UN irrelevant to solving the problem. That could give the Bush administration an excuse to act unilaterally, or bilaterally with Israel.

Regime change in Iran has been the subject of several Bush administration pronouncements. Most prominent was George Bush’s promise to make regime change his target for his second term. Yes, the US and Israel occupy the strategic positions to use preemptive force on Iran. But if they do, the consequences would be profound. It would unleash a massive wave of violence in the Middle East that has no precedent. It would encompass Iraq, Kuwait, and more. US military deaths suffered so far in Iraq would seem light by comparison. Civilian deaths would skyrocket. Are we prepared for such a slaughter?

No? Then we must craft a better approach than preemptive force. There is a more germane choice that has never been tried. I am talking about a more generous diplomatic engagement.

Oh yes, some will say the EU-3 has been trying that for a couple years with no success. But the EU-3 wasn’t able to engage generously with Iran. The US was holding all the “carrots” that would entice Iran and wouldn’t let go of them. The US holds license to the latest nuclear power plants and other modern technology. The US has unilateral sanctions against Iran that prevent US companies and many companies from allied nations from investing in Iran. Let us explore a more generous diplomatic engagement plan.

Many observers have offered ideas on how to better negotiate with Iran. I will borrow from those to compile an outline for serious, sincere, and generous negotiations.

The US/EU should:

1. Discontinue its inflammatory rhetoric toward Iran, even though the current Iranian president continues his ranting. Switch to more conciliatory and encouraging policy statements. This would go a long way toward smoothing diplomatic relations.
2. Lift the US-imposed sanctions on Iran which have been in place since 1979. This will allow US businesses and those of many allied nations to invest in important projects including oil and gas

production and pipelines. Besides offering a strong boost to the Iranian economy it would be a powerful show of good will.

3. The US should actively join the EU-3 in diplomatic engagement to achieve transparency in Iran's nuclear program, Iran's cooperation with IAEA inspectors, and ratification of the Advanced Safeguards Protocol by the Iranian parliament. These negotiations should recognize Iran's inalienable right under the NPT to develop a nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes.
4. Build on the February 2005 proposal by IAEA Director General Baradei to develop multilateral owned and controlled regional centers for all the world's civilian uranium enrichment needs. This could start by promoting Moscow's joint venture proposal to Iran to perform its uranium enrichment in Russia under strict observation. Iran has indicated it might be receptive to that plan.
5. Offer Iran the latest technology in civilian nuclear powerplants along with a guaranteed ongoing international supply of fuel. While helping to satisfy Iran's needs and desires this would also reduce Iran's incentive to invest in its own nuclear fuel cycle.
6. Make extensive concrete offers and collaboration in other economic, political, cultural, and social aid. Remember that 57% of Iran's people live in poverty and the unemployment rate is 14%
7. America should drop the drive for democracy and freedom in the Middle East/Central Asia region and respect indigenous desires and cultures. Some cultures do not show any liking for democracy. Recent events in South America illustrate that people even prefer an autocratic government if it addresses their social needs.
8. Show clear and unambiguous support for the NPT by taking steps to meet the disarmament provisions of the Article VI "good-faith clause."

As a result of serious negotiations we should expect certain agreements on the part of Iran. Here is a list of what those might be.

Iran should agree to:

1. Complete cooperation and transparency with the IAEA in regards to its nuclear fuel enrichment program.
2. Accept fair and equitable controls of the nuclear fuel cycle as outlined in the IAEA Secretary General's proposal for international facilities and storage.
3. Ratify the Advanced Safeguards Protocol.
4. Stop construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak.
5. Renounce any ambitions to extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel.
6. Renounce its rights under Article X of the NPT to withdraw from the treaty.
7. A good faith willingness to abide by the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

These steps are all possible but will not be taken voluntarily by an administration focused on Pax Americana and an expanded US footprint in the oil-rich Middle East/Central Asia region. It will be up to the people to see that meaningful negotiations are implemented by our government.

#

REFERENCES

- About USEC; "Quick Facts," United States Enrichment Corporation. See http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/Aboutusec_quickfacts.asp
- Agence France Presse; "Iran Warns of Preemptive Strike to Prevent Attack on Nuclear Sites," 19 August 2004.
- Agence France Presse; "Defiant Iran Warns UN," 13 January 2006.
- Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud; Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, 17 September 2005. Posted by the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy at <http://www.acronym.org/docs/0509/doc19.htm>
- Akbar, Ali; "Iran and Russia Sign Nuclear Fuel Deal," Associated Press, 27 February 2005.
- Albright, David; "Iran at a Nuclear Crossroads," address to the Institute for Science and International Security, 20 February 2003. Available at <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/crossroads.html>
- Allen, Mike and Ricks, Thomas E.; "US to Cut Forces in Europe, Asia," *Washington Post*, 16 August 2004.
- Allen, Mike; "Report Critical of Rumsfeld is Pulled After DOD Protest," *Washington Post*, 16 May 2005.
- Associated Press, "US Moves On Iran," 9 May 2003. Available at <http://informationclearinghouse.info/article3289.htm>
- BASIC Media Release – "EU and US Policy Won't Stop Iran Acquiring Nuclear Weapons," released by British American Security Information Council, 6 December 2005.
- BBC News; "Annan 'Dismayed' by Iran Remarks," 28 October 2005.
- BBC News; "UN Raps Iran's Anti-Israel Rant," 28 October 2005.
- Bloomberg; "Japan Plans Second Iran Loan to Secure Oil Amid US Protest," *Iran Expert*, 22 February 2004. Available at <http://www.iranexpert.com/2004/japan23february.htm>
- Bodansky, Yossef; *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War On America* (Roseville, CA; Prima Publishing, a division of Random House; 1999,2001).
- Broad, William J.; "Uranium Traveled to Iran Via Russia, Inspectors Find." *The New York Times*, 28 February 2004.
- Broad, William J. and Sanger, David E.; "Iran Still Making Nuclear materials, UN Agency Says," *The New York Times*, 2 June 2004.
- Bumiller, Elisabeth; "Bush to Back Pentagon Plan to Redeploy 70,000 Troops," *The New York Times*, 15 August 2004.
- Burns, Robert; "Rumsfeld Says US on Brink of Major Military Changes in Korea and Europe," Yahoo News Canada, 4 June 2004.
- Castle, Stephen; "Bush Threatens reprisals Over EU Arms Sales to China," *Independent* (London), 23 February 2005.
- Chadda, Sudhir; "Converging US navy Aircraft Carrier groups in Middle East Send Strong Message to Iran and Syria," *India Daily*, 12 March 2005.
- China Daily*; "Images Show Iran Heavy Water Plant Nearly Done," 5 March 2005.

Daniszewski, John; "Iran Said to Seek Nuclear Technology in Europe," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 January 2006.

Davis, Ian and Ingram, Paul; "Taking the Wind Out of the Perfect Geopolitical Storm: Iran and the Crisis Over Non-Proliferation," posted by Foreign Policy In Fact, 23 November 2005. At <http://www.fpiif.org/fpifxt/2936>

Deutsche Welle (Germany); "Iran Allegedly Builds Secret Facility for Nuke Program," 28 November 2004.

Deutsche Welle (Germany); "Iran Denies Shifting Assets From Europe," 21 January 2006.

Entous, Adam; "Bush: US Looking Into Whether Iran Involved in 9/11," Reuters, 19 July 2004.

Foss, Brad and Jahn, George; "Iran Sanctions Could Drive Oil Past \$100," Associated Press, 22 January 2006.

Framework for a Long-Term Agreement Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and France, Germany & United Kingdom with the Support of the High Representative of the European Union, dated 5 August 2005.

Franz, Douglas; "Evidence May Indicate Iran Closing In On Nuclear Arms," *Los Angeles Times*, 27 August 2003.

Gardiner, Beth (Associated Press); "Pressure Grows On Iran to Halt Nuclear Activity," published in San Jose (CA) *Mercury News*, 17 January 2006.

GOV/2004.90 – "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," a resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors, 29 November 2004. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-90_derestrict.pdf

Harris, Francis; "America Would Back Israel Attack On Iran," *News Telegraph* (UK), 18 February 2005.

Hoge, Warren and Sanger, David E.; "Iran Resumes Nuclear Plans, Official States at UN Conference," *The New York Times*, 4 May 2005.

IAEA Nuclear Power Technology Development Section; "Heavy Water Reactors," Available at <http://iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NENP/NPTDS/hlwr2.html>

IEER Report; "Basic Characteristics of Reactor Types," Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, 9 May 1996. Available at <http://www.ieer.org/reports/npd-tbl.html>

Ingram, Paul; "Preliminary Analysis of E3/EU Proposal On Iran," BASIC Notes (British American Security Information Council) 11 August 2005.

Isenberg, David; "Reshaping Washington's Global Footprint," *Asia Times*, 20 August 2004.

Jehl, Douglas and Schmitt, Eric; "US Suggests A Qaida Cell In Iran Directed Saudi Bombings," *The New York Times*, 21 May 2003.

Jerusalem Post; "Report: IAF Trained for Iran Attack," 15 January 2005.

Johnson, Tim (Knight Ridder); "US Views Iran's Nuclear Program As Serious Threat," San Jose (CA) *Mercury News*, 1 April 2003

Johnson, Tim (Knight Ridder); "China, Saudis Seal Energy Links Even as US Issues Threats on Iran," San Jose (CA) *Mercury News*, 25 January 2006.

Johnston, Jennifer; "Regime Change in Iran Now in Bush's Sights," *Sunday Herald* (Scotland), 18 July 2004.

Karimi, Nasser (Associated Press); "Iran Leader Calls for Israel's Destruction," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 26 October 2005.

Kempe, Frederick; "Iran's Defiant Nuclear Ambitions Test Alliances," *The Wall Street Journal*, 17 January 2006.

Klare, Michael T.; "Oil, Geopolitics, and the Coming War With Iran," posted on TomDispatch.com, a project of the Nation Institute, 11 April 2005. Available at <http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=2312>

Klare, Michael T.; "The Iran War Buildup," *The Nation*, 21 July 2005.

Linzer, Dafna; "IAEA Leader's Phone Tapped," *Washington Post*, 12 December 2004.

Linzer, Dafna; "US Uses Drones to Probe Iran for Arms," *Washington Post*, 13 February 2005

MacFarquhar, Neil; "Iran Seeks Incentives From Europe In Impasse," *The New York Times*, 19 May 2005.

Mahnaimi, Uzi and Baxter, Sarah; "Israeli Readies Forces for Strike on Nuclear Iran," *The Sunday Times* (London), 11 December 2005.

Margolis, Eric; "Europe of the 21st Century," *Toronto Sun*, 22 August 2004.

McGovern, Ray; "Attacking Iran: I Know It sounds Crazy," TomDispatch, 2 March 2005. Available at http://www.truthout.org/docs_2005/printer_030205B.shtml

Megatons to Megawatts; "Fact Sheet: US-Russian Megatons to Megawatts Program," 3 January 2006. Available at http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/megatons_fact.asp

Megatons to Megawatts; "Progress Report: USEC-DoE Megatons to Megawatts Program," 30 June 2005. Available at http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/Megatons_DOEstatus.asp

Mercury News, "Protocol Signed to Allow Access to nuclear Sites," 19 December 2003.

Moore, Molly; "Chirac: Nuclear Response to Terrorism is Possible," *Washington Post*, 20 January 2006.

Nakagawa, Hiyoki; "Inpex Pushes Ahead with Iran Oil Field," *The Asahi Shimbun* (Japan), 30 December 2005.

Nelson, Soraya Sarhaddi (Knight Ridder); "Tehran Refuses Weapons Search," San Jose (CA) *Mercury News*, 11 June 2003.

NPT – *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, signed in Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970.

Paivar, Amir; "Iran Vows 'Burning Hell' for Any Aggressor," Reuters, 10 February 2005.

Penketh, Anne; "UN Nuclear Watchdog Rebuts Claims that Iran is Trying to Make A-Bomb," *The Independent* (London), 14 August 2005.

Persbo, Andreas; The IAEA and Iran – Iran's Check-mate Prematurely Called," an occasional paper of the British American Security Information Council, 12 June 2004. At <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN040305.htm>

Persbo, Andreas and Andrews, Dave; "The IAEA and Iran: No Smoking Guns So Far but the Smell of Gunpowder Linger in the Air," an occasional paper of the British American Security Information Council, 5 March 2004. Available at <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN040305.htm>

Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet; published by the US Department of Energy, September 2004.

PLRC-021016 -- *Understanding the "War on Terrorism": The Oil & Gas Interests -- Part 1*, 16 October 2002.

PLRC-030503 -- *Understanding the "War on Terrorism": "Pax Americana" and Preemptive Force*, Pacific Life Research Center paper dated 3 May 2003.

PLRC-030528 – *Understanding the "War on Terrorism": Preemptive Force – A Sequel*, a Pacific Life Research Center paper dated 28 May 2003.

Recknagel, Charles; "Iran: IAEA Passes Resolution Endorsing Nuclear Freeze," Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty, 29 November 2004. Available at <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/11/1091C5B5-C591-4FA4-B2AE-3BC0F862AB4F.html>

Response of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Framework Agreement Proposed by EU#/EU, August 2005.

Reuters wire services; "Bush Raises Option of Using Force in Iran," 13 August 2005.

Reuters wire services; "Rice: Force Against Iran Not Option at This Point," *The New York Times*, 12 January 2006.

Richter, Paul; "US Adds Israel to the Iran Equation," *Los Angeles Times*, 21 January 2005.

Risk Report, The; "Iran Nuclear Update, 2003," publication of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Volume 9, Number 5 (September-October 2003). At <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/iran/nke2003.htm>

Robbins, Carla Anne and Crawford, David; "Iran's Nuclear Decision Starts Shockwave," *The Wall Street Journal*, 11 January 2006.

Robbins, Carla Anne; "Russia Won't Block UN Iran Hearing," *The Wall Street Journal*, 12 January 2006.

Robbins, Carla Anne; "West Talks tough With Iran, Treads Lightly," *The Wall Street Journal*, 23 January 2006.

Royce, Knut and Phelps, Timothy M.; "Secret Talks With Iranian Arms Dealer," *Newsday*, 8 August 2003.

Sanger, David E. and Broad, William J.; "Iran Admits That it Has Plans for a Newer Centrifuge," *The New York Times*, 13 February 2003.

Sciolino, Elaine; "Europe Gets Iran to Extend Freeze in Nuclear Work," *The New York Times*, 26 May 2005.

Sciolino, Elaine; "Europe Threatens to Punish Iran if Nuclear Work Restarts," *The New York Times*, 3 August 2005.

Settle, Frank; "Nuclear Chemistry Uranium Production." Posted by General Chemistry Case Studies at <http://www.chemcases.com/2003version/nuclear/nc-06.htm>

Shaffer, Brenda; "Iran At The Nuclear Threshold," *Arms Control Today*, November 2003.

Shenon, Philip; "9/11 Panel's Report to Offer New Evidence of Iran-Qaida Ties," *The New York Times*, 18 July 2004.

Sherman, Jason; "US Shifts Troops Around the World," *Defense News*, 31 May 2004.

Smyth, Gareth and Bozorgmehr, Najmeh; "Iran Moves Foreign Assets Amid Sanctions Threat," *Financial Times*, 20 January 2006.

Spiegel Online; "Is Washington Planning a Military Strike?" internet site of *Der Spiegel* (Germany), 30 December 2005.

Urquhart, Conal and Howard, Michael; "Former Covert Israeli Forces 'Training Kurds in Iraq'," *The Guardian*, 2 December 2005.

Voice of America, "Iran's Heavy Water Reactor, posted on Payvand's Iran News, 12 April 2004. Available at <http://www.payvand.com/news/04/apr/1075.html>

Walcott, John; "US Probes Iran Link To Saudi Bombings," San Jose (CA) *Mercury News*, 15 May 2003.

Warrick, Joby; "Iran Said To Be Producing Bioweapons," *Washington Post*, 15 May 2003.

Warrick, Joby; "Nuclear Program in Iran Tied to Pakistan," *Washington Post*, 21 December 2003.

Washington File; "United States Welcomes IAEA Resolution on Iran," press release by US State Department's International Information Programs, 26 November 2003. search at <http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile...>

Washington File; "Iran Disguising Weapons Programs as Energy Projects, Rice Says," press release by US State Department's International Information Programs, 4 February 2005. search at <http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile...>

Washington File; "Attack on Iran 'Not On Agenda,' Says Rice in London," press release by US State Department's International Information Programs, 4 February 2005. search at <http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile...>

Washington File; "US to Lift Objections Against Iranian Bid to Join the WTO," press release by US State Department's International Information Programs, 11 March 2005. search at <http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile...>

Weisman, Steven R. and Sciolino, Elaine and Sanger, David E.; "Rice Says US Won't Aid Europe on Iran Incentives," *The New York Times*, 4 February 2005.

Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia; "Heavy Water," 8 January 2006, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heavy_water

Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia; "Iran and weapons of Mass Destruction," updated 6 January 2006. Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction

Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia; “Yadavaran Field,” updated 10 December 2005. Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yadavaran_Field

GLOSSARY

AIOC	Anglo Iranian Oil Company (now BP-Amoco-Arco).
BASIC	British American Security Information Council.
BP	British Petroleum.
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (US)
DoD	Department of Defense (US).
DoE	Department of Energy (US).
EU	European Union.
EU-3	European Union-3 (France, Germany, and Britain).
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency (of the UN).
MI-6	Britain’s equivalent of the CIA.
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty (regarding nuclear weapons).
UK	United Kingdom.
UN	United Nations.
US	United States.
USEC	United States Enrichment Corporation.
WTO	World Trade Organization.

APPENDIX - A

MAP OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR SITES



APPENDIX - B

US MILITARY BASES SURROUNDING IRAN



